

Flux (D65–D66)

D65

a (B49a) Heracl. *Alleg.* 24.4

ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἶμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν [cf. **R9**].

b (< B12) Cleanthes apud Ar. Did. in Eus. *PE* 15.20.2

ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ.

c (< A6) Plat. *Crat.* 402a

[ΣΩ.] λέγει πον Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῆ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης.

d (< T353 Mouraviev) Sen. *Epist.* 58.23

hoc est, quod ait Heraclitus: “in idem flumen bis descendimus et non discendimus.” manet enim idem fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est.

Flux (D65–D66)

D65

a (B49a) Heraclitus, *Homeric Allegories*

We step and we do not step into the same rivers, we are and we are not [cf. **R9**].

b (< B12) Cleanthes in Arius Didymus in Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation*

It is always different waters that flow toward those who step into the same rivers.

c (< A6) Plato, *Cratylus*

[Socrates:] Heraclitus says something like this: that all things flow and nothing remains; and comparing the things that are to the flowing of a river, he says that you could not step twice into the same river.

d (≠ DK) Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*

This is what Heraclitus says: “Into the same river we do and do not step twice.” For the name ‘river’ remains the same, but the water passes by.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY III

D66 (< T156 Mouraviev) Arist. *Metaph.* A6 987a32
[. . .] ταῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις δόξαις, ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ
ρέοντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης [. . .].

Cyclical Alternation of Opposites (D67–D72)

D67 (B126) Schol. in Tzetz. *In Il.*, p. 126
τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὑγρὸν ἀναίεται,
καρφαλέον νοτίζεται.

D68 (B88) Ps.-Plut. *Cons. Ap.* 10 106E
ταυτό γ' ἐνὶ ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ τὸ¹ ἐργηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον
καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκείνά ἐστι,
κακείνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.

D69 (A19) Plut. *Def. orac.* 11 415E
οἱ μὲν ἠβώντων [Hes. Frag. 304.2 Merkelbach-West]
ἀναγιγνώσκοντες ἔτη τριάκοντα ποιούσι τὴν γενεὰν καθ'
Ἡράκλειτον, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ γεννῶντα παρέχει τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ
γεγεννημένον ὁ γεννήσας.

HERACLITUS

D66 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*
[. . .] the Heraclitean doctrines according to which all perceptible
things are constantly flowing and there is no knowledge about them
[. . .].

Cyclical Alternation of Opposites (D67–D72)

D67 (B126) Tzetzes, Scholia on *Commentary on Homer's Iliad*
**Cold things become warm, warm becomes cold, wet
becomes dry, parched becomes moist.**

D68 (B88) Ps.-Plutarch, *Consolation to Apollonius*
**There is the same within, what is living and what is dead,
what is awake and what is sleeping, and what is young and
what is old;** for these, changing, are those, and those, changing in
turn, are these.¹

D69 (A19) Plutarch, *The Obsolescence of Oracles*
Those who read “of men who have reached puberty” [i.e. in a
fragment of Hesiod] define a generation as lasting thirty years,
according to Heraclitus, for it is in this period of time that a parent
produces an offspring from himself that produces offspring.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY III

A Report by Aristotle on the Heracliteans (R19)

R19 (< 65.4) Arist. *Metaph.* Γ5 1010a7–12

ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὀρώντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐθὲν ἀληθεύμενον, περὶ γε τὸ πάντῃ πάντως μεταβάλλον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀληθεύειν. ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνηθησεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων, ἢ τῶν φασκόντων ἡρακλειτίζειν καὶ οἷαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν [. . . = **R23**].

Reports by a Peripatetic on the Heracliteans (R20–R21)

R20 (< Nachtrag II, pp. 421–22) Ps.-Arist. *Probl.* 13.6 908a28–34

διὰ τί, εἴαν τις σκόροδα φάγη, τὸ οὔρον ὄζει, ἄλλων δὲ ἐχόντων ἰσχυρὰν ὁσμὴν οὐκ ὄζει ἐδεσθέντων; πότερον, ὥσπερ τινὲς τῶν ἡρακλειτιζόντων φασίν, ὅτι ἀναθυμιᾶται, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ, καὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι, εἶτα πάλιν ψυχθὲν συνίσταται ἐκεῖ μὲν ὑγρόν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὔρον; [. . .]

R21 (> 66.2) Ps.-Arist. *Probl.* 23.30 934b23–24, 32–36

[. . .] διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ θερμότερα τὰ ἄνω τὸ γὰρ ἀλμυρὸν θερμότερον τοῦ ποτίμου. διὸ καὶ φασί τινες τῶν ἡρακλειτιζόντων ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ποτίμου ξηρανομένου καὶ πηγνυμένου λίθους γίνεσθαι καὶ γῆν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς θαλάττης τὸν ἥλιον ἀναθυμιᾶσθαι.

HERACLITUS

A Report by Aristotle on the Heracliteans (R19)

R19 (< 65.4) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

Furthermore, observing that all this [i.e. perceptible and indeterminate] nature is in motion, and that “true” cannot be said about anything that is changing, [scil. they thought] that it is evidently not possible to say something true about what is changing completely in every way. It was on the basis of this idea that the most extreme doctrine blossomed forth among those we have mentioned, that of those who claim that they are Heraclitizing and the one held by Cratylus [. . .].

Reports by a Peripatetic on the Heracliteans (R20–R21)

R20 (< Nachtrag II, pp. 421–22) Ps.-Aristotle, *Problems*

Why, if one eats garlic, does the urine smell, whereas when other things that have a strong odor are eaten, it does not smell? Is it, as some of the Heraclitizers say, that an evaporation takes place, just as in the universe, so too in the body, and that, when it has cooled off again, moisture forms there and urine here? [. . .]

R21 (> 66.2) Ps.-Aristotle, *Problems*

This [scil. because the sun attracts the lighter elements of a liquid] is why the upper parts [scil. of the sea] are also warmer [scil. besides being salty]; for salty [scil. water] is warmer than potable. And that is why some of the Heraclitizers say that stones and earth are produced from the drying out and solidifying of potable water and that the sun is an evaporation coming from the sea.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY III

Cratylus (R22–R26)

R22 (< T 78 Mouraviev) Plat. *Crat.* 436e–437a

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] ὡς τοῦ παντὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ φερομένου καὶ ρέοντός φαμεν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὀνόματα. ἄλλο τι οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ δηλοῦν;

[KP.] πάνν σφόδρα, καὶ ὀρθῶς γε σημαίνει.

R23 (< 65. 4) Arist. *Metaph.* Γ5 1010a12–15

Κρατύλος [. . .] ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δις τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι· αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἅπαξ.

R24 Plat. *Crat.*

a (65.5) 383a–b

[EP.] Κρατύλος φησὶν ὅδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἂν τινες συνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλώσι, τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς μόριον ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ὀρθότητά τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι καὶ Ἑλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν.

b (T 57 Mouraviev) 390d–e

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] καὶ Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν

HERACLITUS

Cratylus (R22–R26)

R22 (≠ DK) Plato, *Cratylus*

[Socrates:] [. . .] we say that names signify being for us, on the idea that everything is going, moving, and flowing. Do you think that they indicate something else?

[Cratylus:] This is absolutely how it is, and they signify correctly.

R23 (< 65.4) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

[. . .] Cratylus, who in the end thought that it was necessary not to say anything but merely moved his finger, and who reproached Heraclitus for saying that it is not possible to step twice into the same river [cf. **D65**]¹—for he himself thought that this was not possible even once.

R24 Plato, *Cratylus*

a (65.5)

[Hermogenes:] Cratylus here says, Socrates, that there exists by nature a correct name for each of the things that are, and that a name is not whatever some people say who have agreed to use it, uttering some part of their own language, but that there exists naturally a certainly correctness of names that is identical for all, both Greeks and non-Greeks (*barbaroi*).

b (≠ DK)

[Socrates:] And Cratylus says the truth when he says that names belong by nature to things, and that not just anyone

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY III

On the Coexistence of Opposites (R37–R39)

R37 (> A7) Arist. *Metaph.* Γ3 1005b23–26

ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὄντινούν ταῦτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι,
καθάπερ τινὲς οἴονται λέγειν Ἡράκλειτον. οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ
ἀναγκαῖον, ἃ τις λέγει, ταῦτα καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν.

R38 (< T 148 Mouraviev) Arist. *Metaph.* Γ

a 7 1012a24–26

ἔοικε δ' ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλείτου λόγος, λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι,
ἅπαντα ἀληθῆ ποιεῖν [. . .].

b 8 1012a33–b2

σχεδὸν γὰρ οὔτοι οἱ λόγοι οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ Ἡρακλείτου. ὁ γὰρ λέγων
ὅτι πάντ' ἀληθῆ καὶ πάντα ψευδῆ, καὶ χωρὶς λέγει τῶν λόγων
ἐκάτερον τούτων, ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδύνατα ἐκείνα, καὶ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον
εἶναι.

R39 (< T 149 Mouraviev) Arist. *Metaph.* Κ5 1062a30–b11

ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία τούτων ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς, πρὸς μέντοι τὸν
ταῦτα τιθέμενον ἀπόδειξις. ταχέως δ' ἂν τις καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν
Ἡράκλειτον τοῦτον ἐρωτῶν¹ τὸν τρόπον ἠνάγκασεν ὁμολογεῖν
μηδέποτε τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν
ἀληθεύεσθαι.

HERACLITUS

On the Coexistence of Opposites (R37–R39)

R37 (> A7) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

It is impossible for anyone to think that the same thing both is and is not, as some people believe that Heraclitus said—for it is not necessary that what one says one also think.

R38 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

a

The doctrine of Heraclitus, who says that all things are and are not [cf. **D65**, **R9**, **R15**], seems to make everything true [. . .].

b

These theses [scil. that nothing is true and that everything is true] are virtually identical with those of Heraclitus: for he who affirms that everything is true and everything is false also affirms each of these propositions separately, so that if they are impossible, it is also impossible that the first one [scil. be true].

R39 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

There is no simple demonstration regarding this question [i.e. whether something can be and not be at the same time], but there is a demonstration against the person who poses it. And perhaps if someone asked Heraclitus himself in this way, he would oblige him to recognize that it is