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THE AMBITIONS OF QUINTUS CICERO

By T. P. WISEMAN

It was in January or February of 54 B.C., to judge by his brother's extant letters, that Quintus Cicero left for Gaul to serve as a *legatus* in Caesar's army. By June he was already wondering whether or not to return. Cicero urbanely replied to him late in July (*QF* II, 15, 2-3):¹

' Verum attende nunc, mi optime et suavissime frater, ad ea dum rescribo quae tu in hac eadem brevi epistula παραματικῶς valde scripsisti. De quo petis ut ad te nihil occultans, nihil dissimulans, nihil tibi indulgens ingenue fraterneque rescribam, id est, utrum <ad>voles, ut dixeramus, <an> ad expediendum te, si causa sit, commorere. Si, mi Quinte, parva aliqua res esset in qua sciscitari quid vellem, tamen, cum tibi permissurus essem ut faceres quod velles, ego ipse quid vellem ostenderem; in hac vero re hoc profecto quaeris, cuius modi illum annum qui sequitur expectem. Plane aut tranquillum nobis aut certe munitissimum . . . [he goes on to refer to his own popularity, the *gratia* of Caesar and Pompey, and Clodius' powerlessness] . . . Haec ita sentio, iudico, ad te explore scribo; dubitare te non adsentatorie sed fraterne veto. Qua re suavitatem equidem nostrae fruendae causa cuperem te ad id tempus venire quod dixeras, sed illud malo tamen quod putas magis e <re> tua; illa enim magni aestimo, ἀφιλάφρον illam tuam et explicationem debitorum tuorum . . . '

It seems straightforward enough: Quintus had gone to Caesar, like Trebatius and others, to be 'covered in gold' and pay his debts.² But he had not yet made sufficient profit, and was therefore uncertain whether to return that summer, as he and Marcus had arranged, or to stay on. There are difficulties, however: if *ad expediendum te* refers to Quintus' debts, why add *si causa sit*? Surely he would not incur further debts in Gaul? Why was Quintus anxiously inquiring, *in hac vero re*, what the political prospects were for the coming year? Why the portentous language of 'si, mi Quinte, parva aliqua res esset', and Quintus' insistence that his brother should not flatter him or conceal unpleasant truths? Trebatius' enrichment was treated more lightheartedly than this.

Quintus had an interview with Caesar late in August, and decided to stay on, much to Cicero's satisfaction;³ in November, however, he was complaining bitterly about the hardships of his life, and this time his brother's reply was blunter (III, 6, 1):

' Tantum te et moneo et rogo ut in istis molestiis et laboribus et desideriis recordere consilium nostrum quod fuerit perfectionis tuae. Non enim commoda quaedam sequebamur parva ac mediocria. Quid enim erat quod discessu nostro emendum putarem? Praesidium firmissimum petebamus ex optimi et potentissimi viri benevolentia ad omnem statum nostrae dignitatis. Plura ponuntur in spe quam in pecuniis: <qua relicta>⁴ reliqua ad iacturam reserventur. Qua re, si crebro referes animum tuum ad rationem et veteris consilii nostri et spei, facilius istos militiae labores ceteraque quae te offendunt feres et tamen cum voles depones; sed eius rei maturitas nequedum venit et tamen iam adpropinquat.'

Cicero goes on to exhort his brother to write nothing 'quod si prolatum sit moleste feramus',⁵ and his own adherence to this principle accounts for the obscurity of the passage. Again we hear of the plans laid by the brothers before Quintus left, to ends again described as *non . . . parva ac mediocria*. The aim of Cicero and his brother now seems to be Caesar's support (*praesidium*); there is no mention of debts this time, except for the observation that hope is worth more than money. Hope for what? And what is the matter which will soon be ripe, for which Quintus must grit his teeth and wait? Clearly *not* just Caesar's friendship, which both brothers had enjoyed all year, but his support 'ad omnem statum nostrae dignitatis'—whatever that may mean.

¹ References to Cicero's letters *ad Quintum fratrem* are according to the numeration of Watt's Oxford text (1958), which is also followed in quotations except where otherwise stated. Dates are according to the pre-Julian calendar, which in 54 B.C. was about four weeks ahead of the sun.

The final version of this article owes much to constructive criticisms passed on an earlier draft by Mr. Meiggs, Mr. Frederiksen and Professor Badian.

² *Fam.* VII, 5, 2; 16, 3, etc.; 13, 1 'puto te malle a Caesare consuli quam *inaurari*'.

³ *QF* III, 1, 17.

⁴ Emendation by Shackleton Bailey, *JRS* XLV (1955), 38. Watt reads 'quam petimus: reliqua', etc.

⁵ He wrote in similar terms to Atticus about the same time—*Att.* IV, 17, 1.

In August, Cicero had been so busy defending clients in the law-courts that he had had to dictate his letter to Quintus (II, 16, 1) :

‘ sed haec, quoniam tu ita scribis, ferenda sunt, neque committendum ut aut spei aut cogitationi vestrae ego videar defuisse, praesertim cum, id si difficilius fuerit, tamen ex hoc labore magnam gratiam magnamque dignitatem sim conlecturus. Itaque, ut tibi placet, damus operam ne cuius animum offendamus . . . ’

Quintus’ ‘ hope and intention ’ were evidently important enough to induce a consular of Cicero’s standing to be anxious not to cause offence, and (in an unprecedented heatwave⁶) to seek *gratia* and *dignitas* by hard work in the lawcourts. The language is reminiscent of the *commentariolum petitionis*,⁷ and when in September we find Cicero writing to Quintus that ‘ me in eadem epistula, sicut saepe antea, cohortaris ad *ambitionem* et ad laborem ’,⁸ the solution becomes clear. Quintus was proposing to stand for the consulship.

Constans realized this,⁹ but his unobtrusive note has been missed or ignored by historians, and an important motive for Cicero’s political activity—or rather inactivity—in 54 has gone unnoticed. It now becomes clear what the weighty discussion before Quintus’ departure was about, and why Quintus was so concerned with the following year, when he was presumably planning to present himself for election. Cicero kept him closely informed about the consular candidates for 53, and in particular about the prospects of ‘ Messalla noster ’, because it was important to Quintus to know who would be presiding over the elections in that year.¹⁰ Perhaps Quintus’ decision to persevere in Gaul was affected by the postponement of the *comitia*;¹¹ the original arrangement was no doubt that he should come back and start his canvass as soon as the consuls of 53 were elected.

It also becomes clear why, when all four consular candidates were on trial for *ambitus* after Memmius’ disclosure of the *pactio* scandal in September,¹² Cicero was proposing to defend every one of them !¹³ Potential allies had to be gratified ; Quintus was doing his part in Gaul by passing on the good wishes of notable senators to Caesar,¹⁴ while Cicero had promised to help C. Pomptinus to his triumph, though knowing full well that his case was questionable.¹⁵ The necessity of avoiding offence explains Cicero’s unwonted restraint in not answering Piso’s counter-attack to the *in Pisonem*, his anxiety at some social contretemps in which Quintus was involved at Caesar’s camp,¹⁶ and his contrition when he confessed to Atticus that he could not keep his mouth shut during the uproar in the Senate following Memmius’ revelation.¹⁷ He had been avoiding controversial debates,¹⁸ but Gabinius’ inglorious return in October saw him in action again ; this time, however, as he was careful to explain to Quintus, the uproar was in his honour, when Gabinius was provoked to call him *exsul*.¹⁹ Cicero was sorely tempted to prosecute Gabinius, but refrained ; it would cause an open breach with Pompey, and besides, the jurors were unreliable and he might lose his case. Nor would he defend him, as Pompey requested ; and when Gabinius was narrowly acquitted of *maiestas*, Cicero congratulated himself on having avoided the infamy of a defence, earned the gratitude of the accused, and satisfied his *dignitas* without

⁶ *QF* II, 16, 1 ; III, 1, 1 ; Asc. 29 C ; Plut., *Cato min.* 44, 1 (Cato dispensed judgment as praetor without tunic or shoes). *QF* III, 3, 1 for Cicero defending cases every day during October.

⁷ e.g. *comm. pet.* 38, 54 (‘ vitare offensionem ’), etc.

⁸ *QF* III, 1, 12 ; cf. 5, 3 on Caesar’s offer of honores to Cicero : ‘ vivo tamen in ea ambitione et labore, quasi id quod non postulo exspectem.’

⁹ *Cicéron, Correspondance*, tome III (Budé : Paris, 1950), 257 : ‘ on a l’impression que Cicéron attend de l’amitié de César quelque chose comme le consulat pour Quintus ou un second consulat pour lui-même.’ Cicero’s language seems to rule out the second alternative ; although he did have his own hopes of Caesar’s bounty (*QF* III, 5, 3, previous note), they will not have been as definite as Quintus’. *Fam.* VII, 1, 4, on the obsolescence of Cicero’s own *ambitio*, may, however, be disingenuous.

¹⁰ *QF* III, 3, 2 ; 6, 3 ; 7, 3 ; *Att.* IV, 17, 3 ; cf. *QF* III, 1, 16 ; *Att.* IV, 16, 6 for Cicero’s support of Messalla. Compare *Att.* I, 1, 2 on the consuls of 64.

¹¹ The postponement was foreseen in June (*Att.* IV, 16, 6 ; cf. *QF* II, 14, 3) and considered probable in July (*Att.* IV, 15, 7).

¹² *Att.* IV, 17, 2 and 5 ; 18, 3 ; *QF* III, 2, 3 ; 3, 2.

¹³ *QF* III, 3, 2 (‘ causae sunt difficiles ’) ; *Att.* IV, 17, 5 (‘ quid poteris, inquires, pro iis dicere ? ’).

¹⁴ *QF* III, 1, 20.

¹⁵ *QF* III, 4, 6 ; *Att.* IV, 18, 4 (‘ negant enim latum de imperio, et est latum hercule insulse ’) ; Dio xxxix, 65. Note also Taylor, *Athenaeum* XLII (1964), 12–29, esp. 22 ff., on Cicero’s defence of Plancius in August or September : Plancius was a protégé of Crassus, and Cicero had to tread carefully to avoid offending the *boni* (ibid., pp. 25–7).

¹⁶ *QF* III, 1, 11 ; II, 15, 3.

¹⁷ *Att.* IV, 17, 3 : ‘ dices : tamen tu non quiescis ? Ignosce, vix possum.’

¹⁸ *QF* II, 16, 1.

¹⁹ *QF* III, 2, 2 : ‘ o di ! nihil umquam honorificentius nobis accidit.’

offending Pompey.²⁰ He did, however, defend Gabinius in December; the charge this time was extortion, and Gabinius was exiled.²¹

It is no coincidence that at this time Cicero was composing his *Republic*, or as he himself called it, 'de optimo statu civitatis et de optimo cive.'²² For a time he wondered whether or not to make himself one of the interlocutors, no doubt with Quintus, who could be made to give sage advice such as that offered in the *de oratore*; ²³ however, the original plan was adhered to, and the dramatic date put back to the time of Scipio Aemilianus. This had its advantages: although Cicero would have liked to put himself and Quintus at the centre of the stage, a contemporary context might cause offence,²⁴ and it would be hard to avoid naming, explicitly or by implication, the *moderator rei publicae* of books V and VI. As it was, the second-century scene allowed of safe conservative opinions to please the *boni*,²⁵ while the *optimus civis* could remain anonymous: if Pompey—or anyone—chose to read flattering implications into the work, so much the better. Quintus was, however, brought in for the dedicatory preface,²⁶ which was composed in terms singularly appropriate for the forthcoming candidature of a *novus homo* for high office, with invocations of the elder Cato, *homo ignotus et novus*, 'quo omnes qui isdem rebus studemus quasi exemplari ad industriam virtutemque ducimur,' and reminders of the glorious consulship of another new man in 63 B.C.²⁷

The suppression of Cicero's self-justificatory poem *de temporibus suis* is equally significant; 'I decided not to publish it,' he wrote to Lentulus Spinther in December, 'out of respect not for those whom I attacked (for I was sparing in that) but for the innumerable benefactors whom I could not mention individually.'²⁸ Instead, Cicero turned his talents to an epic poem on the invasion of Britain; Quintus, who himself began a similar poem, supplied the raw material and anxiously awaited the completion of the work, and Caesar himself was interested in its progress.²⁹ Perhaps the rebuilding of Quintus' town house, the portico of Catulus and the temple of Tellus was also undertaken at this time with an eye to a forthcoming consular candidature—Tellus' temple was dignified with a statue of Quintus.³⁰ Finally, on 13th January, 53, Cicero proposed to leave Rome as a *legatus* of Pompey. 'Visum est hoc mihi ad multa quadrare'; to Quintus he professed to share the latter's undivided devotion to Caesar,³¹ but both for Quintus' consulship and for his own political future Cicero knew better than to have all his eggs in one basket.

The motive for Quintus' sojourn in Gaul—and for the sudden flowering of Cicero's friendship with Caesar³²—is thus revealed. But when did Quintus and his brother first conceive this plan?

Quintus had been praetor in 62. Admittedly, he had been elected in his brother's consulship, and possibly not even *suo anno*; ³³ but any senator who reached the praetorship, however he managed it, must have calculated his chances of attaining the next and highest office when he became eligible for it after two more years, and Quintus was no exception.³⁴

²⁰ *QF* III, 2, 2; 3, 3; 4, 2-3; 7, 1; *Att.* IV, 18, 1 (Cicero contented himself with testifying—*gravissime*—against Gabinius).

²¹ *Rab. Post.* 34, Dio xxxix, 63, 4-5; Val. Max. IV, 2, 4; see below on the reason for Cicero's *volte-face*—to regain Pompey's support of Milo.

²² *QF* III, 5, 1, also for Quintus' interest in the work.

²³ *De or.* III, 13; cf. I, 4; II, 10 for a flattering picture of Q.—but written at a time when Cicero hoped for an end of *ambitionis occupatio* (I, 1: *de or.* finished November, 55—*Att.* IV, 13, 2).

²⁴ *QF* III, 5, 1-2; cf. *Att.* IV, 6, 2.

²⁵ This may in part explain Cicero's avoidance of Posidonius' advanced ideas on the ethics of imperialism: cf. Strasburger, *JRS* LV (1965), 52-3, who appositely contrasts *QF* I, 1, 27 f.

²⁶ *De rep.* I, 13 for Quintus (though not named).

²⁷ I, 1; 6-7; 10. Scipio is given an unhistorical enthusiasm and respect for Cato (II, 1; cf. III, 40).

²⁸ Dio xxxix, 10, 3 (cf. *Att.* II, 6; XIV, 17, 6); *Fam.* I, 9, 23. Note also *Fam.* I, 9, 26 for Cicero's

careful hedging on the legality of Ap. Claudius' succession of Spinther in Cilicia.

²⁹ *QF* II, 16, 4; III, 4, 4; 5, 4; 6, 3 (Caesar's interest); 7, 6. See Allen, *TAPA* LXXXVI (1955), 143-159.

³⁰ *QF* III, 1, 6 and 14.

³¹ *Att.* IV, 19, 2; cf. *QF* III, 1, 15 and 18; II, 12, 1, etc.

³² References in Gelzer, *PW* VII A, 955-6; cf. Brunt, *PCPS* XI (1965), 10. *QF* III, 1, 9 on the cultivation of Caesar; cf. I, 11 on Cicero's anxiety at hearing that Clodius had been writing to him.

³³ Münzer, *PW* VII A, 1286: Quintus was 'prope aequalis' with Marcus (*QF* I, 3, 3, though in contrast with a father or son), but his *cursus* was consistently four years behind.

³⁴ *QF* I, 1, 41-44; largely about the preservation of Cicero's own *dignitas*, but note §43 'si mea pars nemini cedit, fac ut tua ceteros vincat', and §44 'etiam illud debes cogitare, non te tibi soli gloriam quaerere'.

However, his prospects were not particularly promising. He was no orator,³⁵ he had no cohort of grateful lawcourt clients to call upon, as Marcus had had in 64, and despite competent service as praetor against Catilinarian bands in Bruttium, he had provided no evidence of outstanding military ability. His allotted province of Asia offered little chance of winning martial glory; nor, after its harsh settlement by Sulla following the wars of Mithridates, could it so enrich a governor that he might buy his way to the consulship.³⁶ Not since Sulla's time (so far as is known) had any praetorian governor of Asia returned to take the consulship,³⁷ and Quintus can have had little hope where a Nero, a Silanus and a Dolabella had failed.³⁸

Quintus, then, had none of the advantages whereby a new man might challenge his noble contemporaries, and there were many praetorian *nobiles* who might be competing with him—not only his colleagues Carbo, Philippus, Messalla, Caesar and Bibulus, but half a dozen other *nobiles* from among the praetors of 66 to 63. There was no shortage of potential consuls; moreover, Pompey's purchase of the consulship of 60 for his lieutenant Afranius³⁹ made one less place for ambitious aristocrats to fill, and the potential opposition to Quintus even more formidable.

His one trump card was the very considerable reputation of his brother, whose political power—as a swayer of public opinion and the representative of landed Italian interests—is sufficiently attested by the epithet 'rex' bestowed on him by his opponents.⁴⁰ But though Cicero had great influence, he also had powerful *inimici*—the *nobiles* who begrudged him the consulship, and the *populares* who resented the defeat of Catiline's programme. When both groups gathered behind Clodius to oppose him, Cicero was hard put to it to defend himself, and certainly had no *auctoritas* to spare on any improbable ambitions Quintus might entertain. So it was that when Quintus came back from Asia, he came in mourning, not in triumph.⁴¹ His brother was in exile, he himself threatened with prosecution.⁴² Any riches his province provided must have been spent in attempts to recall Cicero and in making good such practical losses as the burning of Quintus' town house by Clodius' gangs.⁴³

Eventually, through the efforts of Quintus and Milo, and with the help of Pompey, Cicero returned. He had a debt to pay: in the Senate soon after his return he proposed Pompey's *annona* command, and was offered a legateship.⁴⁴ He declined, but Quintus took the job and sailed to Sardinia late in the year. Cicero did not want his brother to go, despite Quintus' confident assurances about the future,⁴⁵ and throughout the winter he pestered Quintus to come back as soon as he could, particularly as the business of Ptolemy's restoration was worrying him, involving as it did two conflicting obligations, to Lentulus Spinther and to Pompey.⁴⁶ So it is clear that Quintus' legateship in Sardinia was not looked on as a long-term investment for a possible future attempt on the consulship, but as an unavoidable service owed to Pompey for his help in the recall, a debt which was to be paid off as quickly and as painlessly as possible.

Quintus finally returned in May, after an interview in Sardinia with Pompey, who had come straight from the conference at Luca to complain of Cicero's attack on the *ager Campanus* legislation. According to Cicero's version in a letter written over two years later to justify his subsequent actions, Pompey again invoked his services to Cicero, saying that Quintus had gone bail for his brother, and that if he didn't want to pay up, Cicero had better change his tune.⁴⁷ We may perhaps doubt if Cicero's adherence to the dynasts' cause was achieved quite so easily as that; Cicero's political strength in the spring of 56 was greater than it had been for years,⁴⁸ while Pompey had quite lost his accustomed popularity

³⁵ *De or.* II, 3.

³⁶ Broughton, *ESAR* IV (1938), 516–9. The unpopularity Quintus earned from his activities in Asia (*QF* I, I, 38, 2 *passim*) would not have helped him in any projected consular candidature.

³⁷ The last on record was L. Valerius Flaccus, *procos.* Asia in 90 and *cos.* 86.

³⁸ Proconsuls of Asia in 80, 76 and 68.

³⁹ *Att.* I, 16, 12.

⁴⁰ *Sull.* 21 (*Torquatus*, 62); *Att.* I, 16, 10 (*Clodius*, 61).

⁴¹ *Sest.* 68.

⁴² *Att.* II, 4, 2; III, 8, 4; 9, 1 and 3; 13, 2; 17, 1; *QF* I, 3, 5; 4, 2 and 5; *domo* 59, 96.

⁴³ *Att.* IV, 3, 2 (*Q.*'s house burnt, November, 57) and 6.

⁴⁴ *Att.* IV, 1, 7; 2, 6.

⁴⁵ *QF* II, 3, 7 (February, 56): 'cetera sunt in rebus nostris cuius modi tu mihi fere diffidenti praedicebas, plena dignitatis et gratiae.'

⁴⁶ *QF* II, 2, 4; 3, 7; 5, 1 and 5; 6, 4; 7 *passim*.

⁴⁷ *Fam.* I, 9, 9; cf. *Pis.* 80; *App.*, *BC* II, 16.

⁴⁸ Milo's thugs now more than a match for Clodius': *QF* II, 3, 4; cf. 5, 2; *Fam.* I, 7, 7 ('quod mihi de nostro statu, de Milonis familiaritate, de levitate et imbecillitate Clodii gratularis...'); *QF* II, 1, 3 for a success by Clodius' gang in December, but

even with the *faex populi*, and was forced to descend to the level of Clodius and Milo in summoning strong-arm men from the country.⁴⁹ There must have been a *quid pro quo* for Cicero—the dynasts would not repeat their mistake of 59, when they could have won him for the price of an augurship.⁵⁰ But whatever Cicero's price was,⁵¹ it was not a consulship for Quintus. In the autumn of 56 he told Atticus that Pompey was rumoured to have in his notebooks the names of as many future consuls as there had been in the past, and his language surely rules out the possibility that Quintus was to be one of the beneficiaries.⁵²

This is the *terminus post quem* for the conception of Quintus' plans; the *terminus ante* is Cicero's letter of formal support and reconciliation written to Crassus in January of 54 B.C.⁵³ What had happened in 55 to make the brothers confident that Quintus had a chance? For the second consulship of Pompey and Crassus meant that there were two fewer openings for the office-hungry *nobiles*,⁵⁴ and correspondingly fiercer competition to be expected for any *novus* who ventured to put himself forward. In any case, the dynasts themselves were thought to control all future consulates; they controlled everything, and Cicero could foresee no change in his generation.⁵⁵

One of their first acts was to have praetors elected for 55—without the sixty-day period demanded by the Senate for a chance to prosecute successful candidates for bribery. By this means they prevented Cato's election and secured that of their own partisans⁵⁶—and one of the successful men was Milo. Milo had co-operated with Pompey in 57 before and after Cicero's return, and had been defended by him in February, 56, against Clodius.⁵⁷ After the conference of Luca, Clodius had apparently reversed his hostile attitude to Pompey⁵⁸—no doubt because the consulship of 54 had been promised to his brother Appius⁵⁹—but Pompey's experience of Clodius would hardly lead him to rely on the permanence of this, and we can assume that Milo's praetorship was obtained with Pompey's help. According to Appian, Pompey had promised Milo the hope of a consulship if he helped in Cicero's recall,⁶⁰ and whether this be true or not, Milo's ambitions for the consulship of 52 are clear from now on.

On 18th November, 55, he married Fausta, and Cicero hurried back from Tusculum to be at the wedding.⁶¹ Milo's prospects were promising for Cicero too, with whom he had been closely associated ever since 58. His praetorship, and his subsequent marriage-alliance with a formidable complex of noble families,⁶² may well have started Cicero thinking along such lines as a forthcoming *coitio* of Milo with Quintus, both backed, of course, by Cicero's own *auctoritas*. The year 52 might, if all went well, be known as *Q. Tullio T. Annio* *cons.*; or, failing that, if Milo at least were elected it would give Quintus a good chance for the following year. It is a fair guess that the first germ of this idea formed part of Cicero's conversations with Pompey at Cumae in May.⁶³

Milo's won the brawl at his trial on 7th February (II, 3, 2).

Boni powerful, attacking Pompey: *QF* II, 3, 2; 5, 3. Consul Marcellinus influential and reliable: Dio xxxix, 27, 3; *QF* II, 5, 2 ('sic bonus ut meliorem non viderim'). Cicero's popularity in attacking Vatinius, Sestius unanimously acquitted: *QF* II, 4, 1, cf. 3, 5-7; 5, 4 ('in iudiciis ii sumus qui fuerimus, domus celebratur ut cum maxime').

⁴⁹ *QF* II, 3, 4; 5, 3.

⁵⁰ *Att.* II, 5, 2: 'quo quidem uno ego ab istis capi possum: vide levitatem meam!'

⁵¹ See additional note for a suggested reconstruction.

⁵² *Att.* IV, 8a, 2: 'si vero id est, quod nescio an sit...'

⁵³ *Fam.* V, 8; see Brunt, loc. cit. (n. 32), 9, on Cicero's relations with Crassus.

⁵⁴ *Plut.*, *Crass.* 15, 3 for the opposition's case: τί δὴ δευτέρως ὑπατεύσας οὗτοι χρῆζουσιν; τί δὲ πάλιν μετ' ἀλλήλων; τί δ' οὐ μὲθ' ἑτέρων; πολλοὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἄνδρες ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀνάξιοι δήπου Κράσσου καὶ Πομπηίου συνάρχειν.

⁵⁵ *Fam.* I, 8, 1; *QF* II, 8, 3 (February, 55).

⁵⁶ *QF* II, 8, 3; *Plut.*, *Pomp.* 52, 3; *Cato min.* 42; Dio xxxix, 32, 1; etc. Cf. Taylor, loc. cit. (n. 15 above), for the dynasts' agents Cn. Plancius and

M. Nonius Sufenas (?) being hastily elected as aediles at about the same time.

⁵⁷ *QF* II, 5, 3 (Pompey's support of Milo offends the *faex populi*); *Mil.* 68; *App.*, *BC* II, 16; *QF* II, 3, 2; Dio xxxix, 18, 2.

⁵⁸ *Har. resp.* 50-52; Dio xxxix, 20, 1; *Schol. Bob.* 170 St.; note *Att.* IV, 8a, 2 on Ahenobarbus' failure to be elected consul in the autumn of 56, brought about by the same people who ruined Cicero—a clear reference to Clodius, acting in Pompey's (and Caesar's) interest. *Schol. Bob.* 174 St. on Pompey's suspicion of Clodius' friendship in 53.

⁵⁹ *QF* II, 5, 4; *Plut.*, *Caes.* 21, 2; Lazenby, *Latomus* XVIII (1959), 72. Compare Ahenobarbus' joke in the Senate in 54, pretending that Appius had gone to Caesar to arrange a military tribunate (*QF* II, 14, 3).

⁶⁰ *BC* II, 16; cf. 20, on Milo's expectation of Pompey's support in 53-52. Appian calls Milo Clodius' colleague as tribune—here, as elsewhere, his chronology is inaccurate (cf. II, 18 and 23).

⁶¹ *Att.* IV, 13, 1.

⁶² *Asc.* 19-20 and 28 C, and Courtney, *Philologus* CV (1961), 151-6 on their solidarity at the trial of Scaurus.

⁶³ *Att.* IV, 11, 1; 12, 1.

Meanwhile, Caesar had sufficiently pacified Gaul to be able to indulge in two gratuitous but spectacular operations in the north—the crossing of the Rhine and the invasion of Britain.⁶⁴ Clearly he was determined to rival the exploits of Pompey at the limits of the known world, and not without success, for the effect at Rome seems to have been electrifying. Several of Caesar's former opponents hastened to make their peace with him,⁶⁵ and on the receipt of his dispatches late in the year an unprecedented twenty-day *supplicatio* was voted by the Senate.⁶⁶ His command in Gaul had been prolonged by a further five years, and it was evident that participation in his victorious campaigns, like those of Pompey in the sixties, was going to be a powerful qualification for prospective consular candidates. So it was that Quintus went to Gaul that winter. He would cultivate Caesar; Cicero would do his best to gratify Pompey, Crassus⁶⁷ and the *boni* at Rome, while at the same time actively forwarding the claims of Milo.

The election of Domitius Ahenobarbus as consul late in 55⁶⁸ must also have seemed a good omen. Cicero had no love for Ahenobarbus,⁶⁹ but his success indicated that *libertas* had returned; the dynasts evidently did *not* have the consular elections in their pocket. In fact, as it turned out, the chaotic return of *libertas* was more fatal to the ambitions of Quintus than the continued domination of Pompey and Caesar would have been. This, however, was not yet apparent, and in 54 everything seemed to be going according to plan. The one worry was Milo. We happen to know that Cicero had written to Caesar about Milo early in 54, in stilted language for which he afterwards apologized;⁷⁰ it must have been a difficult commendation to write. Worse, Pompey's relations with Milo were now rapidly cooling off, doubtless because the latter's new *adfines* were among Gabinius' attackers. The connection with the Gabinius case is clear: Cicero, as we have seen, was tempted to prosecute Gabinius in October, but refrained in order not to offend Pompey. 'Satis est quod instat de Milone'; and if Pompey took offence, he would immediately reconcile himself with Clodius.⁷¹ In November Pompey was giving Milo no help; he was putting all his support behind 'Gutta' (or Cotta⁷²) and saying that he would get Caesar to do the same. Milo was horrified, and saw no hope if Pompey became dictator. Similarly in December: 'angit unus Milo, sed velim finem adferat consulatus'; Cicero was doing as much as he had done for his own consulship, and Quintus was helping in Gaul.⁷³ But Pompey had to be won, and we can now see what made Cicero defend Gabinius for *repetundae* in December.

That winter, Quintus' hopes might have seemed brighter than Milo's, but such appearances were delusive. Milo was prepared to ruin himself to win, planning vast and unnecessary games and running up phenomenal debts.⁷⁴ He was more ruthless than Quintus, better equipped to tackle the disastrous and uncontrolled *σπουδαρχία*⁷⁵ among the factions of the *nobilitas* which had broken out almost as soon as Pompey and Crassus had laid down office. The *pactio* of 54 was the first manifestation of it, followed by the manoeuvring that prevented the holding of consular elections for 53. In December, 54, Cicero was confident that *Messalla noster* would soon be elected;⁷⁶ but he and Calvus only entered office in the following August, after the imprisonment of the tribune Q. Pompeius Rufus (a friend of Clodius who had attacked Messalla in 54⁷⁷); and even then they did not hold

⁶⁴ Stevens, *Antiquity* XXI (1947), 3–9, esp. 5–6, and *Latomus* XI (1952), 13–16 on the propaganda value of Caesar's British expedition.

⁶⁵ Catullus II, II–2; 45, 22 for the reaction at Rome; Suet., *Dŷ* 73 (cf. Tenney Frank, *AJP* XL [1919], 409–11) on Memmius', Calvus' and Catullus' reconciliations with Caesar—winter, 55/4?

⁶⁶ Caes., *BG* IV, 38. Cf. *prov. cons.* 26–7 on the fifteen-day *supplicatio* voted in 56: only ten days' thanksgiving had been voted to Pompey in 63.

⁶⁷ *Fam.* V, 8.

⁶⁸ After 14th November (*Att.* IV, 13, 1 'comitiorum nonnulla opinio').

⁶⁹ *Att.* IV, 8a, 2; cf. Shackleton Bailey, *Philologus* CV (1961), 73–4 on the unnamed *inimicus* of *Fam.* I, 9, 2.

⁷⁰ *Fam.* VII, 5, 3, 'vetere verbo'.

⁷¹ *QF* III, 2, 2; 4, 2.

⁷² Hoffa's conjecture (i.e. M. Aurelius Cotta, PW no. 109) is perhaps supported by the blatantly

corrupt 'Cato' of *QF* III, 4, 1, the man who brought Pompey the news of Gabinius' acquittal; cf. Shackleton Bailey, *PCPS* VII (1961), 3, who suggests 'Cotta' or 'Otho'.

⁷³ *QF* III, 6, 6; 7, 2.

⁷⁴ *QF* III, 6, 6; *Fam.* II, 6, 3; *Mil.* 95 for his *munera*; Pliny, *NH* XXXVI, 104 for his debts (70 m. *HS*!), and Schol. Bob. 169–174 St. on Cicero's speech in the Senate in 53 against Clodius' attack *de aere alieno Milonis*.

⁷⁵ Dio XL, 46, 2; 48, 1; cf. 45, 4 for a tribunician proposal in 53 that consular tribunes should be elected, to increase the number of ἀρχοντες.

⁷⁶ *QF* III, 7, 3: 'si per interregem, sine iudicio, si per dictatorem, sine periculo'.

⁷⁷ *Att.* IV, 17, 5; *QF* III, 2, 3. Asc. 50–51 C (cf. Syme, *Sallust* [1964], 32) for Rufus' friendship with Clodius; he was also the brother of the woman Clodius had been pursuing at the *Bona Dea* celebrations in 62!

the elections for the following year because of the prevailing anarchy and bloodshed.⁷⁸ These were the *comitia* at which Quintus had intended to stand.

This was not the only blow Quintus' hopes suffered in 53. His military activities in Gaul had at first done him nothing but good: Caesar, who well knew how much effect his dispatches could have on elections,⁷⁹ had provided a long and generous account of Quintus' defence of the winter camp against the Nervii.⁸⁰ In the following season, however, his carelessness was responsible for the perilous attack of the Sugambri on the camp at Aduatuca. The reference to Quintus in the sixth book of Caesar's commentaries is noticeably cooler than the unreserved praise of the year before, and in a private letter to Cicero, Caesar was outspoken in his criticism: 'neque pro cauto ac diligente se castris continuit'.⁸¹ This boded ill for Quintus' hopes, and by the second half of 53 he must surely have given them up. Milo, however, was still in the field, strongly backed by Cicero;⁸² but on 18th January, 52, Clodius was ambushed and murdered at Bovillae. Milo had gone too far. The dream was over.

Quintus' ambitions were throttled in part at least by the same σπουδαρχία that brought down the Republic:⁸³ but for the strength and reckless determination of their optimate contemporaries, Caesar's legates in Gaul should have had a good chance of election to the consulship.⁸⁴ In Quintus' case, however, his own shortcomings had much to do with it as well, and Caesar's friendship seems to have lapsed—he even held Quintus responsible for Cicero's disappointing departure to Pompey in 49.⁸⁵ Yet it may be that Quintus still preserved hopes of Caesar's patronage: for several months after the battle of Pharsalus he and his son attempted to win the dictator's favour by denigrating Cicero and dissociating themselves from him. This sorry episode betrays blatant ingratitude for Cicero's careful efforts on his brother's behalf six years before, and it is to Caesar's credit that the ambitions of Quintus Cicero went finally unrewarded.

ADDITIONAL NOTE

Cicero and the Luca conference

Historians are agreed that after Luca Cicero 'came to heel', but they rarely explain precisely why. Even Mr. Stockton's recent analysis (*TAPA* xciii [1962], 471–89) seems to me deficient in this; granted that Pompey's complaint may have been enough to make Cicero back down on the question of the Campanian land, is it sufficient to account for a complete political *volte-face*, for a palinode of which Cicero was ashamed (*Att.* iv, 5, 1) and a change of policy for which he was still excusing himself in December, 54? Stockton rightly stresses Cicero's strength (pp. 487–8; cf. Cary, *CQ* xvii [1923], 103 ff., and Lazenby, *Latomus* xviii [1959], 67–8), and early in 56 Cicero himself was certainly conscious of it (see n. 48 above); the weakness of the dynasts' position, on the other hand, is clear from the fact that even after the Luca conference it took them nine months to get Pompey and Crassus elected as consuls for 55 against Domitius Ahenobarbus' opposition. They only succeeded by means of an *interregnum* (cf. Staveley, *Historia* iii [1954–55], 193–211, esp. 203–4), but Domitius managed to get elected *cos. prior* for the following year while his two enemies were still in office.

It therefore seems unlikely that the dynasts were strong enough to win Cicero over by threats. What could they offer to persuade him? Evidently not an augurship, since the place in the college

⁷⁸ Dio xl, 45, 6.

⁷⁹ Observe the ἐπιστεῖλα of P. Crassus in *BG* iii, 7–8; ii, 20–27 on the campaigns of 56—he was elected to an augurate in 55. Similarly vii, 56–62 on Labienus' siege of Paris, written not in the winter of 52–1, when Caesar was fully occupied (viii, 4), but presumably in Belgium during the winter of 51–50; by September, 50, at least, Labienus had hopes of standing for the consulship (viii, 52). This seems to me to be valuable neglected evidence for the composition and publication of the commentaries.

⁸⁰ *Caes.*, *BG* v, 38–52.

⁸¹ vi, 42, 1 (contrast v, 40, 7; 52, 2); letter *ap.* Charisius *GLK* i, 126. cf. Adami, *Hermes* lxxviii (1943), 281–5, for the unconvincing hypothesis, based on Caesar's friendship with Cicero, that the fragment refers not to Quintus but to (e.g.) Q. Titurius Sabinus.

⁸² *Fam.* ii, 6 (to Curio, asking for his support). Cicero went to Ravenna to see Caesar late in 53: Caesar wanted Caelius Rufus' support as tribune for the following year (*Att.* vii, 1, 4), and was surely asked to support Milo in return.

⁸³ cf. n. 75 above. Cato realized the problem: when defeated for the consulship of 51, he refused to stand again—it was the duty of the good man not to pursue his candidature ὑπὲρ τὸ προσήκον (Dio xl, 58, 9).

⁸⁴ cf. Ser. Sulpicius Galba (Hirt., *BG* viii, 50, 3), and T. Labienus (*ibid.*, 52, 2 and Syme, *JRS* xxviii [1938], 121–3).

⁸⁵ *Att.* xi, 12, 1–2: 'Q. fratrem lituum meae profectiois fuisse (ita enim scripsit)'. It was Atticus who reconciled Q. and his son to Caesar (*Nep.*, *Att.* 7, 3).

that was vacant in 56 went to young Crassus, whose early death—through which Cicero finally gained the honour—could hardly have been foreseen. The censorship would surely have bought him—he planned in October, 57, to stand at the next censorial *comitia* (*Att.* IV, 2, 6)—but this was not in the dynasts' power to give, even if they wanted to.

Perhaps the answer is that Cicero asked for, and was given, *carte blanche* to recall and attack Caesar's father-in-law L. Piso, who is treated very roughly in the *de prov. cons.* Cicero was anxious in these months to justify himself retrospectively about his exile and return: hence the eulogy of his supporters in the *pro Sestio* (and doubtless the *pro Bestia*—*QF* II, 3, 5–6), and his request to Luceius for a monograph on the years 63–57, with the chance to expose 'multorum in nos perfidiam, insidias, prodicionem' (*Fam.* v, 12, 4). The *in Pisonem* was a perfect vehicle for revenge and the defence of *dignitas*—and it seems that Piso shrank from facing it (Nisbet, *Cicero in L. Calpurnium Pisonem* [1961], 200 on his slow return from Macedonia).

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