THE AMBITIONS OF QUINTUS CICERO

By T. P. WISEMAN

It was in January or February of 54 B.C., to judge by his brother’s extant letters, that Quintus Cicero left for Gaul to serve as a legatus in Caesar’s army. By June he was already wondering whether or not to return. Cicero urbanely replied to him late in July (QF II, 15, 2–3) [1]:

‘Verum attende nunc, mi optime et suavissime frater, ad ea dum rescribo quae tu in hac eadem brevi epistula πραγματικῶς valde scripsisti. De quo petis ut ad te nihil occultans, nihil dissimulans, nihil tibi indulgens ingenue fraterneque rescribam, id est, utrum (ad)voleas, ut dixeramus, (an) ad expediendum te, si causa sit, commorere. Sì, mi Quinte, parva aliqua res esset in qua scisci-tarere quid vellem, tamen, cum tibi permisi esserem ut faceres quod velles, ego ipse quid vellem ostenderem; in hac vero re hoc profecto quaerem, utrum (ad)voles, ut dixeramus, (an) ad expediendum te, si causa sit, commorere. Plane aut tranquillum nobis aut certe munitissimum ... [he goes on to refer to his own popularity, the gratia of Caesar and Pompey, and Clodius’ powerlessness] ... Haece ita sentio, judico, ad te explorate scribo; dubitate te non ad ventre sed fraterne veto. Qua re suavitatem equidem nostrae fruendae causa cuperem te ad id tempus venire quo dixeras, sed illud malo tamen quod putas magis e (re) tua; illa enim magni aestimo, ἀφρασίαν illum tuam et explicationem debitorum tuaorum ...’

It seems straightforward enough: Quintus had gone to Caesar, like Trebatius and others, to be ‘covered in gold’ and pay his debts.2 But he had not yet made sufficient profit, and was therefore uncertain whether to return that summer, as he and Marcus had arranged, or to stay on. There are difficulties, however: if ad expediendum te refers to Quintus’ debts, why add si causa sit? Surely he would not incur further debts in Gaul? Why was Quintus anxiously inquiring, in hac vero re, what the political prospects were for the coming year? Why the portentous language of ‘si, mi Quinte, parva aliqua res esset’, and Quintus’ insistence that his brother should not flatter him or conceal unpleasant truths? Trebatius’ enrichment was treated more lightheartedly than this.

Quintus had an interview with Caesar late in August, and decided to stay on, much to Cicero’s satisfaction; 3 in November, however, he was complaining bitterly about the hardships of his life, and this time his brother’s reply was blunter (III, 6, 1):

‘Tantum te et moneo et rogo ut in istis molestiis et laboribus et desideriis recordere consilium nostrum quod fuerit profectionis tuae. Non enim commoda quaedam sequeramur parva ac mediocria. Quid enim erat quod discessu nostro emendum putamus? Praesidium firmissimum petebamus ex optimi et potentissimi viri benevolentia ad omnem statum nostrae dignitatis. Plura ponuntur in spe quam in pecuniis: <qua relicta> 4 reliqua ad iacturam reserventur. Qua re, si crebro referes animum tuum ad rationem et veteris consilii nostri et spei, facilius istos militiae labores ceteraque quae te offendunt feres et tamen cum voles depones; sed eius rei maturitas nequidem venit et tamen iam adpropinquat.’

Cicero goes on to exhort his brother to write nothing ‘quod si prolatum sit moleste feramus’, 5 and his own adherence to this principle accounts for the obscurity of the passage. Again we hear of the plans laid by the brothers before Quintus left, to ends again described as non ... parva ac mediocria. The aim of Cicero and his brother now seems to be Caesar’s support (praesidium); there is no mention of debts this time, except for the observation that hope is worth more than money. Hope for what? And what is the matter which will soon be ripe, for which Quintus must grit his teeth and wait? Clearly not just Caesar’s friendship, which both brothers had enjoyed all year, but his support ‘ad omnem statum nostrae dignitatis’—whatever that may mean.

1 References to Cicero’s letters ad Quintum fratrem are according to the numeration of Watt’s Oxford text (1958), which is also followed in quotations except where otherwise stated. Dates are according to the pre-Julian calendar, which in 54 B.C. was about four weeks ahead of the sun.

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2 Fam. VII, 5, 2; 16, 3, etc.; 13, 1 ‘puto te malle a Caesare consuli quam inaurari’.

3 QF III, 1, 17.


5 He wrote in similar terms to Atticus about the same time—Att. IV, 17, 1.
In August, Cicero had been so busy defending clients in the law-courts that he had had to dictate his letter to Quintus (II, 16, 1):

‘sed haec, quoniam tu ita scribis, ferenda sunt, neque committendum ut aut spei aut cogitationi vestrae ego videor defuissae, praeassertim cum, id si difficilium fuerit, tamen ex hoc labore magnum gratiam magnumque dignitatem sim connecturus. Itaque, ut tibi placet, damus operam ne cuius animum offendamus...’

Quintus’ ‘hope and intention’ were evidently important enough to induce a consular of Cicero’s standing to be anxious not to cause offence, and (in an unprecedented heatwave 6) to seek gratia and dignitas by hard work in the lawcourts. The language is reminiscent of the commentariolum petitionis,7 and when in September we find Cicero writing to Quintus that ‘me in eadem epistula, sicut saepe antea, cohortaris ad ambitionem et ad laborem’,8 the solution becomes clear. Quintus was proposing to stand for the consulship.

Constans realized this,9 but his unobtrusive note has been missed or ignored by historians, and an important motive for Cicero’s political activity—or rather inactivity—in 54 has gone unnoticed. It now becomes clear what the weighty discussion before Quintus’ departure was about, and why Quintus was so concerned with the following year, when he was presumably planning to present himself for election. Cicero kept him closely informed about the consular candidates for 53, and in particular about the prospects of Messalla noster, because it was important to Quintus to know who would be presiding over the elections in that year.10 Perhaps Quintus’ decision to persevere in Gaul was affected by the postponement of the comitia;11 the original arrangement was no doubt that he should come back and start his canvass as soon as the consuls of 53 were elected.

It also becomes clear why, when all four consular candidates were on trial for ambitus after Memmius’ disclosure of the pactio scandal in September,12 Cicero was proposing to defend every one of them!13 Potential allies had to be gratified; Quintus was doing his part in Gaul by passing on the good wishes of notable senators to Caesar,14 while Cicero had promised to help C. Pompeius to his triumph, though knowing full well that his case was questionable.15 The necessity of avoiding offence explains Cicero’s unwonted restraint in not answering Piso’s counter-attack to the in Pisonem, his anxiety at some social contretemps in which Quintus was involved at Caesar’s camp,16 and his contrition when he confessed to Atticus that he could not keep his mouth shut during the uproar in the Senate following Memmius’ revelation.17 He had been avoiding controversial debates,18 but Gabinius’ inglorious return in October saw him in action again; this time, however, as he was careful to explain to Quintus, the uproar was in his honour, when Gabinius was provoked to call him exsul.19 Cicero was sorely tempted to prosecute Gabinius, but refrained; it would cause an open breach with Pompey, and besides, the jurors were unreliable and he might lose his case. Nor would he defend him, as Pompey requested; and when Gabinius was narrowly acquitted of maiestas, Cicero congratulated himself on having avoided the infamy of a defence, earned the gratitude of the accused, and satisfied his dignitas without...
offending Pompey.20 He did, however, defend Gabinius in December; the charge this time was extortion, and Gabinius was exiled.21

It is no coincidence that at this time Cicero was composing his *Republic*, or as he himself called it, *de optimo statu civitatis et de optimo cive.*22 For a time he wondered whether or not to make himself one of the interlocutors, no doubt with Quintus, who could be made to give sage advice such as that offered in the *de oratore*;23 however, the original plan was adhered to, and the dramatic date put back to the time of Scipio Aemilianus. This had its advantages: although Cicero would have liked to put himself and Quintus at the centre of the stage, a contemporary context might cause offence,24 and it would be hard to avoid naming, explicitly or by implication, the *moderator rei publicae* of books V and VI. As it was, the second-century scene allowed of safe conservative opinions to please the *boni*,25 while the *optimus cives* could remain anonymous: if Pompey—or anyone—chose to read flattering implications for the forthcoming candidature of a *novus homo* for high office, with invocations of the elder Cato, *homo ignotus et novus*, 'quo omnes qui isdem rebus studemus quasi exemplari ad industrium virtutemque ducimur,' and reminders of the glorious consulship of another new man in 63 B.C.26

The suppression of Cicero's self-justificatory poem *de temporibus suis* is equally significant; 'I decided not to publish it,' he wrote to Lentulus Spinther in December, 'out of respect not for those whom I attacked (for I was sparing in that) but for the innumerable benefactors whom I could not mention individually.'28 Instead, Cicero turned his talents to an epic poem on the invasion of Britain; Quintus, who himself began a similar poem, supplied the raw material and anxiously awaited the completion of the work, and Caesar himself was interested in its progress.29 Perhaps the rebuilding of Quintus' town house, the portico of Catulus and the temple of Tellus was also undertaken at this time with an eye to a forthcoming consular candidature—'Tellus' temple was dignified with a statue of Quintus.30 Finally, on 13th January, 53, Cicero proposed to leave Rome as a legatus of Pompey. 'Visum est hoc mihi ad multa quadrare'; to Quintus he professed to share the latter's undivided devotion to Caesar,31 but both for Quintus' consulship and for his own political future Cicero knew better than to have all his eggs in one basket.

The motive for Quintus' sojourn in Gaul—and for the sudden flowering of Cicero's friendship with Caesar32—is thus revealed. But when did Quintus and his brother first conceive this plan?

Quintus had been praetor in 62. Admittedly, he had been elected in his brother's consulship, and possibly not even *suo anno*;33 but any senator who reached the praetorship, however he managed it, must have calculated his chances of attaining the next and highest office when he became eligible for it after two more years, and Quintus was no exception.34

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20 *QF* III, 2, 2; 3, 3; 4, 2–3; 7, 1; *Att. IV*, 18, 1 (Cicero contented himself with testifying—gravissime—against Gabinius).

21 *Rab. Post.*, 34, *Dio* XXXIX, 63, 4–5; *Val. Max.* IV, 2, 4; see below on the reason for Cicero's volte-face to regain Pompey's support of Milo.

22 *QF* III, 5, 1, also for Quintus' interest in the work.

23 *De or.* III, 13; cf. *QF* II, 4, 11, 10 for a flattering picture of Q.;—but written at a time when Cicero hoped for an end of *ambitionem occupatum* (cf. *QF* III, 1: *de or.* finished November, 55—*Att. IV*, 13, 2).

24 *QF* III, 5, 1–2; cf. *Att. IV*, 6, 2.

25 This may in part explain Cicero's avoidance of *Posidonium*’s advanced ideas on the ethics of imperialism; cf. *Strabo*, *JRS* LV (1965), 52–3, who appositely contrasts *QF* I, 1, 27 f.

26 *De rep.* 1, 13 for Quintus (though not named), 1, 1; 6–7; 16. Scipio is given an unhistorical enthusiasm and respect for Cato (cf. *QF* I, 1; *Att. IV*, 40).

27 *Dio* XXXIX, 10, 3 (cf. *Att. II*, 6; *XIV*, 17, 6); *Fam.* 1, 9, 23. Note also *Fam. I*, 9, 26 for Cicero's careful hedging on the legality of Ap. Claudius' succession of Spinther in Cilicia.

28 *QF* II, 16, 4; III, 4, 4; 5, 4; 6, 3 (Caesar's interest); 7, 6. See Allen, *TAPA* LXXXVI (1955), 143–159.

29 *QF* III, 1, 6 and 14.

30 *Att.* IV, 19, 2; cf. *QF* III, 1, 15 and 18; II, 12, 1, etc.

31 *QF* III, 1, 9; cf. *Brunt*, *PCPS* xi (1965), 10. *QF* III, 1, 9 on the cultivation of Caesar; cf. *QF* I, 11 on Cicero's anxiety at hearing that Clodius had been writing to him.

32 *Dio* III, 2, 2; 3, 3; 4, 2–3; 7, 1; *Att. IV*, 18, 1 (Cicero contented himself with testifying—gravissime—against Gabinius).

33 *QF* III, 1, 15 and 18; II, 12, 1, etc.

However, his prospects were not particularly promising. He was no orator, he had no cohort of grateful lawcourt clients to call upon, as Marcus had had in 64, and despite competent service as praetor against Catilinarian bands in Bruttium, he had provided no evidence of outstanding military ability. His allotted province of Asia offered little chance of winning martial glory; nor, after its harsh settlement by Sulla following the wars of Mithridates, could it so enrich a governor that he might buy his way to the consulship. Not since Sulla’s time (so far as is known) had any praetorian governor of Asia returned to take the consulship, and Quintus can have had little hope where a Nero, a Silanus and a Dolabella had failed.

Quintus, then, had none of the advantages whereby a new man might challenge his noble contemporaries, and there were many praetorian nobles who might be competing with him—not only his colleagues Carbo, Philippus, Messalla, Caesar and Bibulus, but half a dozen other nobles from among the praetors of 66 to 63. There was no shortage of potential consuls; moreover, Pompey’s purchase of the consulship of 60 for his lieutenant Afranius made one less place for ambitious aristocrats to fill, and the potential opposition to Quintus even more formidable.

His one trump card was the very considerable reputation of his brother, whose political power—as a swayer of public opinion and the representative of landed Italian interests—is sufficiently attested by the epithet ‘rex’ bestowed on him by his opponents. But though Cicero had great influence, he also had powerful inimici—the nobles who begrudged him the consulship, and the populares who resented the defeat of Catiline’s programme. When both groups gathered behind Clodius to oppose him, Cicero was hard put to it to defend himself, and certainly had no auctoritas to spare on any improbable ambitions Quintus might entertain. So it was that when Quintus came back from Asia, he came in mourning, not in triumph. His brother was in exile, he himself threatened with prosecution. Any riches his province provided must have been spent in attempts to recall Cicero and in making good such practical losses as the burning of Quintus’ town house by Clodius’ gangs.

Eventually, through the efforts of Quintus and Milo, and with the help of Pompey, Cicero returned. He had a debt to pay: in the Senate soon after his return he proposed Pompey’s annona command, and was offered a legateship. He declined, but Quintus took the job and sailed to Sardinia late in the year. Cicero did not want his brother to go, despite Quintus’ confident assurances about the future, and throughout the winter he pestered Quintus to come back as soon as he could, particularly as the business of Ptolemy’s restoration was worrying him, involving as it did two conflicting obligations, to Lentulus Spinther and to Pompey. So it is clear that Quintus’ legateship in Sardinia was not looked on as a long-term investment for a possible future attempt on the consulship, but as an unavoidable service owed to Pompey for his help in the recall, a debt which was to be paid off as quickly and as painlessly as possible.

Quintus finally returned in May, after an interview in Sardinia with Pompey, who had come straight from the conference at Luca to complain of Cicero’s attack on the ager Campanus legislation. According to Cicero’s version in a letter written over two years later to justify his subsequent actions, Pompey again invoked his services to Cicero, saying that Quintus had gone bail for his brother, and that if he didn’t want to pay up, Cicero had better change his tune. We may perhaps doubt if Cicero’s adherence to the dynasts’ cause was achieved quite so easily as that; Cicero’s political strength in the spring of 56 was greater than it had been for years, while Pompey had quite lost his accustomed popularity

35 De or. II, 3.
36 Broughton, ESAR IV (1938), 516–9. The unpopularity Quintus earned from his activities in Asia (QF I, I, 38, 2 passim) would not have helped him in any projected consulardcandidature.
37 The last on record was L. Valerius Flaccus, provos. Asia in 90 and cos. 86.
38 Proconsuls of Asia in 90, 76 and 68.
39 Att. I, 1, 12.
40 Sull. 21 (Torquatus, 62); Att. I, 16, 10 (Claudius, 61).
41 Sest. 68.
42 Att. II, 4, 2; III, 8, 4; 9, 1 and 3; 13, 2; 17, 1; QF I, 3, 5; 4 and 5; domo 59, 96.
43 Att. IV, 3, 2 (Q.’s house burnt, November, 57) and 6.
44 Att. IV, 1, 7; 2, 6.
45 QF II, 3, 7 (February, 56): ‘cetera sunt in rebus nostris cuius modi tu mihi fere diffidenti praediceps, plena dignitas et gratiae.’
46 QF II, 2, 4; 3, 7; 5, 1 and 3; 6, 4; 7 passim.
47 Fam, 1, 9, 9; cf. Pit. 80; App., BC II, 16.
48 Milo’s thugs now more than a match for Clodius’: QF II, 3, 4; cf. 5, 2; Fam. 1, 7, 7 (‘quod mihi de nostro statu, de Milonis familiaritate, de levitate et imbecillitate Clodi graturalis . . . ’); QF II, 1, 3 for a success by Clodius’ gang in December, but
even with the *faex populi*, and was forced to descend to the level of Clodius and Milo in summoning strong-arm men from the country.\(^50\) There must have been a *quid pro quo* for Cicero—the dynasts would not repeat their mistake of 59, when they could have won him for the price of an augurship.\(^50\) But whatever Cicero’s price was,\(^51\) it was not a consulship for Quintus. In the autumn of 56 he told Atticus that Pompey was rumoured to have in his notebooks the names of as many future consuls as there had been in the past, and his language surely rules out the possibility that Quintus was to be one of the beneficiaries.\(^52\)

This is the terminus post quem for the conception of Quintus’ plans; the terminus ante is Cicero’s letter of formal support and reconciliation written to Crassus in January of 54 B.C.\(^53\) What had happened in 55 to make the brothers confident that Quintus had a chance? For the second consulship of Pompey and Crassus meant that there were two fewer openings for the office-hungry nobles,\(^54\) and correspondingly fiercer competition to be expected for any *novus* who ventured to put himself forward. In any case, the dynasts themselves were thought to control all future consulates; they controlled everything, and Cicero could foresee no change in his generation.\(^55\)

One of their first acts was to have praetors elected for 55—without the sixty-day period demanded by the Senate for a chance to prosecute successful candidates for bribery. By this means they prevented Catō’s election and secured that of their own partisans\(^56\)—and one of the successful men was Milo. Milo had co-operated with Pompey in 57 before and after Cicero’s return, and had been defended by him in February, 58, against Clodius.\(^57\) After the conference of Luca, Clodius had apparently reversed his hostile attitude to Pompey\(^58\)—no doubt because the consulship of 54 had been promised to his brother Appius\(^89\)—but Pompey’s experience of Clodius would hardly lead him to rely on the permanence of this, and we can assume that Milo’s praetorship was obtained with Pompey’s help. According to Appian, Pompey had promised Milo the hope of a consulship if he helped in Cicero’s recall,\(^89\) and whether this be true or not, Milo’s ambitions for the consulship of 52 are clear from now on.

On 18th November, 55, he married Fausta, and Cicero hurried back from Tusculum to be at the wedding.\(^61\) Milo’s prospects were promising for Cicero too, with whom he had been closely associated ever since 58. His praetorship, and his subsequent marriage-alliance with a formidable complex of noble families,\(^62\) may well have started Cicero thinking along such lines as a forthcoming *coitio* of Milo with Quintus, both backed, of course, by Cicero’s own *auctoritas*. The year 52 might, if all went well, be known as *Q. Tullio T. Amnio coss.*; or, failing that, if Milo at least were elected it would give Quintus a good chance for the following year. It is a fair guess that the first germ of this idea formed part of Cicero’s conversations with Pompey at Cumae in May.\(^63\)
Meanwhile, Caesar had sufficiently pacified Gaul to be able to indulge in two gratuitous but spectacular operations in the north—the crossing of the Rhine and the invasion of Britain. Clearly he determined to rival the exploits of Pompey at the limits of the known world, and not without success, for the effect at Rome seems to have been electrifying. Several of Caesar’s former opponents hastened to make their peace with him, and on the receipt of his dispatches late in the year an unprecedented twenty-day supplicatio was voted by the Senate. His command in Gaul had been prolonged by a further five years, and it was evident that participation in his victorious campaigns, like those of Pompey in the sixties, was going to be a powerful qualification for prospective consular candidates. So it was that Quintus went to Gaul that winter. He would cultivate Caesar; Cicero would do his best to gratify Pompey, Crassus, and the boni at Rome, while at the same time actively forwarding the claims of Milo.

The election of Domitius Ahenobarbus as consul late in 55 must also have seemed a good omen. Cicero had no love for Ahenobarbus, but his success indicated that libertas had returned; the dynasts evidently did not have the consular elections in their pocket. In fact, as it turned out, the chaotic return of libertas was more fatal to the ambitions of Quintus than the continued domination of Pompey and Caesar would have been. This, however, was not yet apparent, and in 54 everything seemed to be going according to plan. The one worry was Milo. We happen to know that Cicero had written to Caesar about Milo early in 54 with the Gabinius case is clear: Cicero, as we have seen, was tempted to prosecute Gabinius for repetundae in December. In November Pompey was giving Milo no help; he was putting all his support behind Gutta (or Cotta) and saying that he would get Caesar to do the same. Milo was horrified, and saw no hope if Pompey became dictator. Similarly in December: angit unus Milo, sed velim finem adferat consulatus; Cicero was doing as much as he had done for his own consulship, and Quintus was helping in Gaul. But Pompey had to be won, and we can now see what made Cicero defend Gabinius for repetundae in December.

That winter, Quintus’ hopes might have seemed brighter than Milo’s, but such appearances were delusive. Milo was prepared to ruin himself to win, planning vast and unnecessary games and running up phenomenal debts. He was more ruthless than Quintus, better equipped to tackle the disastrous and uncontrolled among the factions of the nobilitas which had broken out almost as soon as Pompey and Crassus had laid down office. The pactio of 54 was the first manifestation of it, followed by the manoeuvring that prevented the holding of consular elections for 53. In December, 54, Cicero was confident that Messalla noster would soon be elected; but he and Calvinus only entered office in the following August, after the imprisonment of the tribune Q. Pompeius Rufus (a friend of Clodius who had attacked Messalla in 54); and even then they did not hold

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64 Stevens, Antiquity xxi (1947), 3-9, esp. 5-6, and Latomus xi (1952), 13-16 on the propaganda value of Caesar’s British expedition.
65 Catullus ii, 11-2; 45, 22 for the reaction at Rome; Suet., DF 73 (cf. Tenney Frank, AJP xl [1919], 409-11) on Memmius’, Calvus’ and Catullus’ reconciliations with Caesar—winter, 55/4?
66 Caes., BG iv, 58. Cf. prov. cons. 26-7 on the fifteen-day supplicatio voted in 46: only ten days’ thanksgiving had been voted to Pompey in 63.
67 Fam. v, 8.
68 After 14th November (Att. iv, 13, 1: ‘comitiorum nonnulla opinio’).
69 Att. iv, 8a, 2; cf. Shackleton Bailey, Philologus cv (1961), 73-4 on the unnamed inimicus of Fam. 1, 9, 2.
70 Fam. vii, 5, 3: ‘vetere verbo’.
71 QF iii, 2, 2; 4, 2.
72 Hoffa’s conjecture (i.e. M. Aurelius Cotta, PW no. 109) is perhaps supported by the blatantly corrupt ‘Cato’ of QF iii, 4, 1, the man who brought Pompey the news of Gabinius’ acquittal; cf. Shackleton Bailey, PCPS vii (1961), 3, who suggests ‘Cotta’ or ‘Votto’.
73 QF iii, 6, 6; 7, 2.
74 QF iii, 6, 6; Fam. ii, 6, 3; Mil. 95 for his munera; Pliny, NH xxxiv, 104 for his debts (70 m. HS’); and Schol. Bob. 169-174 St. on Cicero’s speech in the Senate in 53 against Clodius’ attack de aere alieno Milonis.
75 Dio xli, 46, 2; 48, 1; cf. 45, 4 for a tribunician proposal in 53 that consular tribunes should be elected, to increase the number of aediles.
76 QF iii, 2, 1: ‘si per interregem, sine iudicio, si per dictatorem, sine periculo’.
77 Att. iv, 17, 5; QF iii, 2, 3. Asc. 50-51 C (cf. Syme, Sallust (1964), 32) for Rufus’ friendship with Clodius; he was also the brother of the woman Clodius had been pursuing at the Bona Dea celebrations in 62!
the elections for the following year because of the prevailing anarchy and bloodshed.\textsuperscript{78} These were not the only blow Quintus' hopes suffered in 53. His military activities in Gaul had at first done him nothing but good: Caesar, who well knew how much effect his dispatches could have on elections,\textsuperscript{79} had provided a long and generous account of Quintus' defence of the winter camp against the Nervii.\textsuperscript{80} In the following season, however, his carelessness was responsible for the perilous attack of the Sugambri on the camp at Aduatuca. The reference to Quintus in the sixth book of Caesar's commentaries is noticeably cooler than the unreserved praise of the year before, and in a private letter to Cicero, Caesar was outspoken in his criticism: '\textit{neque pro cauto ac diligente se castris continuit}'.\textsuperscript{81} This boded ill for Quintus' hopes, and by the second half of 53 he must surely have given them up. Milo, however, was still in the field, strongly backed by Cicero;\textsuperscript{82} but on 18th January, 52, Clodius was ambushed and murdered at Bo villae. Milo had gone too far. The dream was over.

Quintus' ambitions were throttled in part at least by the same \textit{σπουδαρχία} that brought down the Republic;\textsuperscript{83} but for the strength and reckless determination of their optimate contemporaries, Caesar's legates in Gaul should have had a good chance of election to the consulship.\textsuperscript{84} In Quintus' case, however, his own shortcomings had much to do with it as well, and Caesar's friendship seems to have lapsed—he even held Quintus responsible for Cicero's disappointing departure to Pompey in 49.\textsuperscript{85} Yet it may be that Quintus still preserved hopes of Caesar's patronage: for several months after the battle of Pharsalus he and his son attempted to win the dictator's favour by denigrating Cicero and dissociating themselves from him. This sorry episode betrays blatant ingratitude for Cicero's careful efforts on his brother's behalf six years before, and it is to Caesar's credit that the ambitions of Quintus Cicero went finally unrewarded.

### ADDITIONAL NOTE

**Cicero and the Luca conference**

Historians are agreed that after Luca Cicero 'came to heel', but they rarely explain precisely why. Even Mr. Stockton's recent analysis (\textit{TAPA} xcvii [1962], 471–89) seems to me deficient in this; granted that Pompey's complaint may have been enough to make Cicero back down on the question of the Campanian land, is it sufficient to account for a complete political \textit{volte-face}, for a palinode of which Cicero was ashamed (\textit{Att.} iv, 5, 1) and a change of policy for which he was still excusing himself in December, 54? Stockton rightly stresses Cicero's strength (pp. 487–8; cf. Cary, \textit{CQ} xvii [1923], 103 ff., and Lazenby, \textit{Latomus} xviii [1959], 67–8), and early in 56 Cicero himself was certainly conscious of it (see n. 48 above); the weakness of the dynasts' position, on the other hand, is clear from the fact that even after the Luca conference it took them nine months to get Pompey and Crassus elected as consuls for 55 against Domitius Ahenobarbus' opposition. They only succeeded by means of an \textit{interregnum} (cf. Staveley, \textit{Historia} iii [1954–55], 193–211, esp. 203–4), but Domitius managed to get elected \textit{cos. prior} for the following year while his two enemies were still in office.

It therefore seems unlikely that the dynasts were strong enough to win Cicero over by threats. What could they offer to persuade him? Evidently not an augurship, since the place in the college

\textsuperscript{78} Dio xi, 45, 6.

\textsuperscript{79} Observe the \textit{αποστολή} of P. Crassus in \textit{BG} iii, 7–8; iv, 20–27 on the campaigns of 56—he was elected to an augurate in 55. Similarly vii, 56–62 on Labienus' siege of Paris, written not in the winter of 52–1, when Caesar was fully occupied (viii, 4), but presumably in Belgium during the winter of 51–50; by September, 50, at least, Labienus had hopes of standing for the consulship (viii, 52). This seems to me to be valuable neglected evidence for the composition and publication of the commentaries.

\textsuperscript{80} Caes., \textit{BG} v, 38–52.

\textsuperscript{81} VI, 42, 1 (contrast v, 40, 7; 52, 2); letter \textit{ap. Charisius GLK} i, 126. cf. Adami, \textit{Hermes} lxxxviii (1943), 251–5, for the unconvincing hypothesis, based on Caesar's friendship with Cicero, that the fragment refers not to Quintus but to (e.g.) Q. Titurius Sabinus.

\textsuperscript{82} Fam. ii, 6 (to Curio, asking for his support). Cicero went to Ravenna to see Caesar late in 53: Caesar wanted Caelius Rufus' support as tribune for the following year (\textit{Att.} vii, 1, 4), and was surely asked to support Milo in return.

\textsuperscript{83} cf. n. 75 above. Cato realized the problem when defeated for the consulship of 51, he refused to stand again—it was the duty of the good man not to pursue his candidature \textit{ὑπό το πρόσφυγον} (Dio xi, 58, 9).

\textsuperscript{84} cf. Ser. Sulpicius Galba (Hirt., \textit{BG} viii, 50, 3), and T. Labienus (ibid., 52, 2 and Syme, \textit{JRS} xxviii [1938], 121–3).

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Att.} xi, 12, 1–2: 'Q. fratrem litium meae professionis fuisse (ita enim scripsit) '. It was Artius who reconciled Q. and his son to Caesar (Nep., \textit{Att.}, 7, 3).
that was vacant in 56 went to young Crassus, whose early death—through which Cicero finally gained the honour—could hardly have been foreseen. The censorship would surely have bought him—he planned in October, 57, to stand at the next censorial comitia (Att. iv, 2, 6)—but this was not in the dynasts' power to give, even if they wanted to.

Perhaps the answer is that Cicero asked for, and was given, carte blanche to recall and attack Caesar's father-in-law L. Piso, who is treated very roughly in the de prov. cons. Cicero was anxious in these months to justify himself retrospectively about his exile and return: hence the eulogy of his supporters in the pro Sestio (and doubtless the pro Bestia—OF xi, 3, 5–6), and his request to Luceius for a monograph on the years 63–57, with the chance to expose 'multorum in nos perfidiam, insidias, proditionem' (Fam. v, 12, 4). The in Pisonem was a perfect vehicle for revenge and the defence of dignitas—and it seems that Piso shrank from facing it (Nisbet, Cicero in L. Calpurnium Pisonem [1961], 200 on his slow return from Macedonia).

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