

Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)

Jerry A. Fodor

A typical thesis of positivistic philosophy of science is that all true theories in the special sciences should reduce to physical theories in the long run. This is intended to be an empirical thesis, and part of the evidence which supports it is provided by such scientific successes as the molecular theory of heat and the physical explanation of the chemical bond. But the philosophical popularity of the reductionist program cannot be explained by reference to these achievements alone. The development of science has witnessed the proliferation of specialized disciplines at least as often as it has witnessed their reduction to physics, so the widespread enthusiasm for reduction can hardly be a mere induction over its past successes.

I think that many philosophers who accept reductionism do so primarily because they wish to endorse the generality of physics vis-à-vis the special sciences: roughly, the view that all events which fall under the laws of any science are physical events and hence fall under the laws of physics.¹ For such philosophers, saying that physics is basic science and saying that theories in the special sciences must reduce to physical theories have seemed to be two ways of saying the same thing, so that the latter doctrine has come to be a standard construal of the former.

In what follows, I shall argue that this is a considerable confusion. What has traditionally been called 'the unity of science' is a much stronger, and much less plausible, thesis than the generality of physics. If this is true it is important. Though reductionism is an empirical doctrine, it is intended to play a regulative role in scientific practice. Reducibility to physics is taken to be a *constraint* upon the acceptability of theories in the special sciences, with the curious consequence that the more the special sciences succeed, the more they ought to disappear. Methodological problems about psychology, in particular, arise in just this way: the assumption that the subject-matter of psychology is part of the subject-matter of physics is taken to imply that psychological theories must reduce to physical theories, and it is this latter principle that

makes the trouble. I want to avoid the trouble by challenging the inference.

Reductivism is the view that all the special sciences reduce to physics. The sense of 'reduce to' is, however, proprietary. It can be characterized as follows.²

Let

$$(1) S_1x \rightarrow S_2x$$

be a law of the special science S . ((1) is intended to be read as something like 'all S_1 situations bring about S_2 situations.' I assume that a science is individuated largely by reference to its typical predicates, hence that if S is a special science ' S_1 ' and ' S_2 ' are not predicates of basic physics. I also assume that the 'all' which quantifies laws of the special sciences needs to be taken with a grain of salt; such laws are typically *not* exceptionless. This is a point to which I shall return at length.) A necessary and sufficient condition of the reduction of (1) to a law of physics is that the formulae (2) and (3) be laws, and a necessary and sufficient condition of the reduction of S to physics is that all its laws be so reducible.³

$$(2a) S_1x \leftrightarrow P_1x$$

$$(2b) S_2x \leftrightarrow P_2x$$

$$(3) P_1x \rightarrow P_2x.$$

' P_1 ' and ' P_2 ' are supposed to be predicates of physics, and (3) is supposed to be a physical law. Formulae like (2) are often called 'bridge' laws. Their characteristic feature is that they contain predicates of both the reduced and the reducing science. Bridge laws like (2) are thus contrasted with 'proper' laws like (1) and (3). The upshot of the remarks so far is that the reduction of a science requires that any formula which appears as the antecedent or consequent of one of its proper laws must appear as the reduced formula in some bridge law or other.⁴

Several points about the connective ' \rightarrow ' are

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in order. First, whatever other properties that connective may have, it is universally agreed that it must be transitive. This is important because it is usually assumed that the reduction of some of the special sciences proceeds via bridge laws which connect their predicates with those of intermediate reducing theories. Thus, psychology is presumed to reduce to physics via, say, neurology, biochemistry, and other local stops. The present point is that this makes no difference to the logic of the situation so long as the transitivity of ' \rightarrow ' is assumed. Bridge laws which connect the predicates of S to those of S^* will satisfy the constraints upon the reduction of S to physics so long as there are other bridge laws which, directly or indirectly, connect the predicates of S^* to physical predicates.

There are, however, quite serious open questions about the interpretations of ' \rightarrow ' in bridge laws. What turns on these questions is the respect in which reductivism is taken to be a physicalist thesis.

To begin with, if we read ' \rightarrow ' as 'brings about' or 'causes' in proper laws, we will have to have some other connective for bridge laws, since bringing about and causing are presumably *asymmetric*, while bridge laws express symmetric relations. Moreover, if ' \rightarrow ' in bridge laws is interpreted as any relation other than identity, the truth of reductivism will only guarantee the truth of a weak version of physicalism, and this would fail to express the underlying ontological bias of the reductivist program.

If bridge laws are not identity statements, then formulae like (2) claim at most that, by law, x 's satisfaction of a P predicate and x 's satisfaction of an S predicate are causally correlated. It follows from this that it is nomologically necessary that S and P predicates apply to the same things (i.e., that S predicates apply to a subset of the things that P predicates apply to). But, of course, this is compatible with a non-physicalist ontology since it is compatible with the possibility that x 's satisfying S should not itself *be* a physical event. On this interpretation, the truth of reductivism does *not* guarantee the generality of physics vis-à-vis the special sciences since there are some events (satisfactions of S predicates) which fall in the domains of a special science (S) but not in the domain of physics. (One could imagine, for example, a doctrine according to which physical and psychological predicates are both held to apply to organisms, but where it is denied that the event which consists of an organism's satisfying a psychological

predicate is, in any sense, a physical event. The up-shot would be a kind of psychophysical dualism of a non-Cartesian variety; a dualism of events and/or properties rather than substances.)

Given these sorts of considerations, many philosophers have held that bridge laws like (2) ought to be taken to express contingent event identities, so that one would read (2a) in some such fashion as 'every event which consists of x 's satisfying S_1 is identical to some event which consists of x 's satisfying P_1 and vice versa.' On this reading, the truth of reductivism would entail that every event that falls under any scientific law is a physical event, thereby simultaneously expressing the ontological bias of reductivism and guaranteeing the generality of physics vis-à-vis the special sciences.

If the bridge laws express event identities, and if every event that falls under the proper laws of a special science falls under a bridge law, we get the truth of a doctrine that I shall call 'token physicalism.' Token physicalism is simply the claim that all the events that the sciences talk about are physical events. There are three things to notice about token physicalism.

First, it is weaker than what is usually called 'materialism.' Materialism claims *both* that token physicalism is true *and* that every event falls under the laws of some science or other. One could therefore be a token physicalist without being a materialist, though I don't see why anyone would bother.

Second, token physicalism is weaker than what might be called 'type physicalism,' the doctrine, roughly, that every *property* mentioned in the laws of any science is a physical property. Token physicalism does not entail type physicalism because the contingent identity of a pair of events presumably does not guarantee the identity of the properties whose instantiation constitutes the events; not even where the event identity is nomologically necessary. On the other hand, if every event is the instantiation of a property, then type physicalism does entail token physicalism: two events will be identical when they consist of the instantiation of the same property by the same individual at the same time.

Third, token physicalism is weaker than reductivism. Since this point is, in a certain sense, the burden of the argument to follow, I shan't labour it here. But, as a first approximation, reductivism is the conjunction of token physicalism with the assumption that there are natural kind predicate in an ideally completed physics

which correspond to each natural kind predicates in any ideally completed special science. It will be one of my morals that the truth of reductivism cannot be inferred from the assumption that token physicalism is true. Reductivism is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for token physicalism.

In what follows, I shall assume a reading of reductivism which entails token physicalism. Bridge laws thus state nomologically necessary contingent event identities, and a reduction of psychology to neurology would entail that any event which consists of the instantiation of a psychological property is identical with some event which consists of the instantiation of some neurological property.

Where we have got to is this: reductivism entails the generality of physics in at least the sense that any event which falls within the universe of discourse of a special science will also fall within the universe of discourse of physics. Moreover, any prediction which follows from the laws of a special science and a statement of initial conditions will also follow from a theory which consists of physics and the bridge laws, together with the statement of initial conditions. Finally, since 'reduces to' is supposed to be an asymmetric relation, it will also turn out that physics is *the* basic science; that is, if reductivism is true, physics is the only science that is general in the sense just specified. I now want to argue that reductivism is too strong a constraint upon the unity of science, but that the relevantly weaker doctrine will preserve the desired consequences of reductivism: token physicalism, the generality of physics, and its basic position among the sciences.

II

Every science implies a taxonomy of the events in its universe of discourse. In particular, every science employs a descriptive vocabulary of theoretical and observation predicates such that events fall under the laws of the science by virtue of satisfying those predicates. Patently, not every true description of an event is a description in such a vocabulary. For example, there are a large number of events which consist of things having been transported to a distance of less than three miles from the Eiffel Tower. I take it, however, that there is no science which contains 'is transported to a distance of less than three miles from the Eiffel Tower' as part of its

descriptive vocabulary. Equivalently, I take it that there is no natural law which applies to events in virtue of their being instantiations of the property *is transported to a distance of less than three miles from the Eiffel Tower* (though I suppose it is conceivable that there is some law that applies to events in virtue of their being instantiations of some distinct but co-extensive property). By way of abbreviating these facts, I shall say that the property *is transported . . .* does not determine a *natural kind*, and that predicates which express that property are not natural kind predicates.

If I knew what a law is, and if I believed that scientific theories consist just of bodies of laws, then I could say that P is a natural kind predicate relative to S iff S contains proper laws of the form $P_x \rightarrow \alpha_x$ or $\alpha_x \rightarrow P_x$; roughly, the natural kind predicates of a science are the ones whose terms are the bound variables in its proper laws. I am inclined to say this even in my present state of ignorance, accepting the consequence that it makes the murky notion of a natural kind viciously dependent on the equally murky notions *law* and *theory*. There is no firm footing here. If we disagree about what is a natural kind, we will probably also disagree about what is a law, and for the same reasons. I don't know how to break out of this circle, but I think that there are interesting things to say about which circle we are in.

For example, we can now characterize the respect in which reductivism is too strong a construal of the doctrine of the unity of science. If reductivism is true, then *every* natural kind is, or is co-extensive with, a physical natural kind. (Every natural kind *is* a physical natural kind if bridge laws express property identities, and every natural kind is co-extensive with a physical natural kind if bridge laws express event identities.) This follows immediately from the reductivist premise that every predicate which appears as the antecedent or consequent of a law of the special sciences must appear as one of the reduced predicates in some bridge, together with the assumption that the natural kind predicates are the ones whose terms are the bound variables in proper laws. If, in short, some physical law is related to each law of a special science in the way that (3) is related to (1), then every natural kind predicate of a special science is related to a natural kind predicate of physics in the way that (2) relates ' S_1 ' and ' S_2 ' to ' P_1 ' and ' P_2 '.

I now want to suggest some reasons for be-

believing that this consequence of reductivism is intolerable. These are not supposed to be knock-down reasons; they couldn't be, given that the question whether reductivism is too strong is finally an *empirical* question. (The world could turn out to be such that every natural kind corresponds to a physical natural kind, just as it could turn out to be such that the property *is transported to a distance of less than three miles from the Eiffel Tower* determines a natural kind in, say, hydrodynamics. It's just that, as things stand, it seems very unlikely that the world *will* turn out to be either of these ways.)

The reason it is unlikely that every natural kind corresponds to a physical natural kind is just that (a) interesting generalizations (e.g., counter-factual supporting generalizations) can often be made about events whose physical descriptions have nothing in common, (b) it is often the case that *whether* the physical descriptions of the events subsumed by these generalizations have anything in common is, in an obvious sense, entirely irrelevant to the truth of the generalizations, or to their interestingness, or to their degree of confirmation or, indeed, to any of their epistemologically important properties, and (c) the special sciences are very much in the business of making generalizations of this kind.

I take it that these remarks are obvious to the point of self-certification; they leap to the eye as soon as one makes the (apparently radical) move of taking the special sciences at all seriously. Suppose, for example, that Gresham's 'law' really is true. (If one doesn't like Gresham's law, then any true generalization of any conceivable future economics will probably do as well.) Gresham's law says something about what will happen in monetary exchanges under certain conditions. I am willing to believe that physics is *general in the sense that it implies that any event which consists of a monetary exchange* (hence any event which falls under Gresham's law) *has a true description in the vocabulary of physics and in virtue of which it falls under the laws of physics*. But banal considerations suggest that a description which covers all such events must be wildly disjunctive. Some monetary exchanges involve strings of wampum. Some involve dollar bills. And some involve signing one's name to a check. What are the chances that a disjunction of physical predicates which covers all these events (i.e., a disjunctive predicate which can form the right hand side of a bridge law of the form '*x* is a monetary exchange $\Leftrightarrow \dots$ ') expresses a physical natural

kind? In particular, what are the chances that such a predicate forms the antecedent or consequent of some proper law of physics? The point is that monetary exchanges have interesting things in common; Gresham's law, if true, says what one of these interesting things is. But what is interesting about monetary exchanges is surely not their commonalities under *physical* description. A natural kind like a monetary exchange *could* turn out to be co-extensive with a physical natural kind; but if it did, that would be an accident on a cosmic scale.

In fact, the situation for reductivism is still worse than the discussion thus far suggests. For, reductivism claims not only that all natural kinds are co-extensive with physical natural kinds, but that the co-extensions are nomologically necessary: bridge laws are *laws*. So, if Gresham's law is true, it follows that there is a (bridge) law of nature such that '*x* is a monetary exchange $\Leftrightarrow x$ is *P*', where *P* is a term for a physical natural kind. But, surely, there is no such law. If there were, then *P* would have to cover not only all the systems of monetary exchange that there *are*, but also all the systems of monetary exchange that there *could be*; a law must succeed with the counterfactuals. What physical predicate is a candidate for '*P*' in '*x* is a nomologically possible monetary exchange iff P_x '?

To summarize: an immortal econophysicist might, when the whole show is over, find a predicate in physics that was, in brute fact, co-extensive with 'is a monetary exchange'. If physics is general—if the ontological biases of reductivism are true—then there must *be* such a predicate. But (a) to paraphrase a remark Donald Davidson made in a slightly different context, nothing but brute enumeration could convince us of this brute co-extensivity, and (b) there would seem to be no chance at all that the physical predicate employed in stating the co-extensivity is a natural kind term, and (c) there is still less chance that the co-extension would be lawful (i.e., that it would hold not only for the nomologically possible world that turned out to be real, but for any nomologically possible world at all).

I take it that the preceding discussion strongly suggests that economics is not reducible to physics in the proprietary sense of reduction involved in claims for the unity of science. There is, I suspect, nothing special about economics in this respect; the reasons why economics is unlikely to reduce to physics are paralleled by

those which suggest that psychology is unlikely to reduce to neurology.

If psychology is reducible to neurology, then for every psychological natural kind predicate there is a co-extensive neurological natural kind predicate, and the generalization which states this co-extension is a law. Clearly, many psychologists believe something of the sort. There are departments of 'psycho-biology' or 'psychology and brain science' in universities throughout the world whose very existence is an institutionalized gamble that such lawful co-extensions can be found. Yet, as has been frequently remarked in recent discussions of materialism, there are good grounds for hedging these bets. There are no firm data for any but the grossest correspondence between types of psychological states and types of neurological states, and it is entirely possible that the nervous system of higher organisms characteristically achieves a given psychological end by a wide variety of neurological means. If so, then the attempt to pair neurological structures with psychological functions is foredoomed. Physiological psychologists of the stature of Karl Lashley have held precisely this view.

The present point is that the reductivist program in psychology is, in any event, *not* to be defended on ontological grounds. Even if (token) psychological events are (token) neurological events, it does not follow that the natural kind predicates of psychology are co-extensive with the natural kind predicates of any other discipline (including physics). That is, the assumption that every psychological event is a physical event does not guaranty that physics (or, *a fortiori*, any other discipline more general than psychology) can provide an appropriate vocabulary for psychological theories. I emphasize this point because I am convinced that the make-or-break commitment of many physiological psychologists to the reductivist program stems precisely from having confused that program with (token) physicalism.

What I have been doubting is that there are neurological natural kinds co-extensive with psychological natural kinds. What seems increasingly clear is that, even if there is such a co-extension, it cannot be lawlike. For, it seems increasingly likely that there are nomologically possible systems other than organisms (namely, automata) which satisfy natural kind predicates in psychology, and which satisfy no neurological predicates at all. Now, as Putnam has emphasized, if there are any such systems, then

there are probably vast numbers, since equivalent automata can be made out of practically anything. If this observation is correct, then there can be no serious hope that the class of automata whose psychology is effectively identical to that of some organism can be described by *physical* natural kind predicates (though, of course, if token physicalism is true, that class can be picked out by some physical predicate or other). The upshot is that the classical formulation of the unity of science is at the mercy of progress in the field of computer simulation. This is, of course, simply to say that that formulation was too strong. The unity of science was intended to be an empirical hypothesis, defeasible by possible scientific findings. But no one had it in mind that it should be defeated by Newell, Shaw and Simon.

I have thus far argued that psychological reductivism (the doctrine that every psychological natural kind is, or is co-extensive with, a neurological natural kind) is not equivalent to, and cannot be inferred from, token physicalism (the doctrine that every psychological event is a neurological event). It may, however, be argued that one might as well take the doctrines to be equivalent since the only possible *evidence* one could have for token physicalism would also be evidence for reductivism: namely, the discovery of type-to-type psychophysical correlations.

A moment's consideration shows, however, that this argument is not well taken. If type-to-type psychophysical correlations would be evidence for token physicalism, so would correlations of other specifiable kinds.

We have type-to-type correlations where, for every n -tuple of events that are of the same psychological kind, there is a correlated n -tuple of events that are of the same neurological kind. Imagine a world in which such correlations are *not* forthcoming. What is found, instead, is that for every n -tuple of type identical psychological events, there is a spatiotemporally correlated n -tuple of type *distinct* neurological events. That is, every psychological event is paired with some neurological event or other, but psychological events of the same kind may be paired with neurological events of different kinds. My present point is that such pairings would provide as much support for token physicalism as type-to-type pairings do *so long as we are able to show that the type distinct neurological events paired with a given kind of psychological event are identical in respect of whatever properties are relevant to type-identification in psy-*

chology. Suppose, for purposes of explication, that psychological events are type identified by reference to their behavioral consequences.⁵ Then what is required of all the neurological events paired with a class of type homogeneous psychological events is only that they be identical in respect of their behavioral consequences. To put it briefly, type identical events do not, of course, have *all* their properties in common, and type distinct events must nevertheless be identical in *some* of their properties. The empirical confirmation of token physicalism does not depend on showing that the neurological counterparts of type identical psychological events are themselves type identical. What needs to be shown is only that they are identical in respect of those properties which determine which kind of *psychological* event a given event is.

Could we have evidence that an otherwise heterogeneous set of neurological events have these kinds of properties in common? Of course we could. The neurological theory might itself explain why an n -tuple of neurologically type distinct events are identical in their behavioral consequences, or, indeed, in respect of any of indefinitely many other such relational properties. And, if the neurological theory failed to do so, some science more basic than neurology might succeed.

My point in all this is, once again, not that correlations between type homogeneous psychological states and type heterogeneous neurological states would prove that token physicalism is true. It is only that such correlations might give us as much reason to be token physicalists as type-to-type correlations would. If this is correct, then the epistemological arguments from token physicalism to reductivism must be wrong.

It seems to me (to put the point quite generally) that the classical construal of the unity of science has really misconstrued the *goal* of scientific reduction. The point of reduction is *not* primarily to find some natural kind predicate of physics co-extensive with each natural kind predicate of a reduced science. It is, rather, to explicate the physical mechanisms whereby events conform to the laws of the special sciences. I have been arguing that there is no logical or epistemological reason why success in the second of these projects should require success in the first, and that the two are likely to come apart *in fact* wherever the physical mechanisms whereby events conform to a law of the special sciences are heterogeneous.

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I take it that the discussion thus far shows that reductivism is probably too strong a construal of the unity of science; on the one hand, it is incompatible with probable results in the special sciences, and, on the other, it is more than we need to assume if what we primarily want is just to be good token physicalists. In what follows, I shall try to sketch a liberalization of reductivism which seems to me to be just strong enough in these respects. I shall then give a couple of independent reasons for supposing that the revised doctrine may be the right one.

The problem all along has been that there is an open empirical possibility that what corresponds to the natural kind predicates of a reduced science may be a heterogeneous and un-systematic disjunction of predicates in the reducing science, and we do not want the unity of science to be prejudiced by this possibility. Suppose, then, that we allow that bridge statements may be of the form

$$(4) S_x \rightleftarrows P_1x \vee P_2x \vee \dots \vee P_nx,$$


where ' $P_1 \vee P_2 \vee \dots \vee P_n$ ' is *not* a natural kind predicate in the reducing science. I take it that this is tantamount to allowing that at least some 'bridge laws' may, in fact, not turn out to be laws, since I take it that a necessary condition on a universal generalization being lawlike is that the predicates which constitute its antecedent and consequent should pick out natural kinds. I am thus supposing that it is enough, for purposes of the unity of science, that every law of the special sciences should be reducible to physics by bridge statements which express true empirical generalizations. Bearing in mind that bridge statements are to be construed as a species of identity statements, (4) will be read as something like 'every event which consists of x 's satisfying S is identical with some event which consists of x 's satisfying some or other predicate belonging to the disjunction ' $P_1 \vee P_2 \vee \dots \vee P_n$ '.

Now, in cases of reduction where what corresponds to (2) is not a law, what corresponds to (3) will not be either, and for the same reason. Namely, the predicates appearing in the antecedent or consequent will, by hypothesis, not be natural kind predicates. Rather, what we will have is something that looks like (5) (see next page).

That is, the antecedent and consequent of the reduced law will each be connected with a dis-

junction of predicates in the reducing science, and, if the reduced law is exceptionless, there will be laws of the reducing science which connect the satisfaction of each member of the disjunction associated with the antecedent to the satisfaction of some member of the disjunction associated with the consequent. That is, if $S_1x \rightarrow S_2x$ is

(5) Law of special science X:



exceptionless, then there must be some proper law of the reducing science which either states or entails that $P_1x \rightarrow P^*$ for some P^* , and similarly for P_2x through P_nx . Since there must be such laws, it follows that each disjunct of ' $P_1 \vee P_2 \vee \dots \vee P_n$ ' is a natural kind predicate, as is each disjunct of ' $P_1^* \vee P_2^* \vee \dots \vee P_n^*$ '.

This, however, is where push comes to shove. For, it might be argued that if each disjunct of the P disjunction is lawfully connected to some disjunct of the P^* disjunction, it follows that (6) is itself a law.

$$(6) P_1x \vee P_2x \vee \dots \vee P_nx \rightarrow P_1^*x \vee P_2^*x \vee \dots \vee P_n^*x.$$

The point would be that (5) gives us $P_1x \rightarrow P_2^*x$, $P_2x \rightarrow P_m^*x$, etc., and the argument from a premise of the form $(P \supset R)$ and $(Q \supset S)$ to a conclusion of the form $(P \vee Q) \supset (R \vee S)$ is valid.

What I am inclined to say about this is that it just shows that 'it's a law that —' defines a non-truth functional context (or, equivalently for these purposes, that not all truth functions of natural kind predicates are themselves natural kind predicates). In particular, that one may not argue from 'it's a law that P brings about R ' and 'it's a law that Q brings about S ' to 'it's a law that P or Q brings about R or S '. (Though, of course, the argument from those premises to ' P or Q brings about R or S ' *simpliciter* is fine.) I think, for example, that it is a law that the irradiation of green plants by sunlight causes carbohydrate synthesis, and I think that it is a law that

friction causes heat, but I do not think that it is a law that (either the irradiation of green plants by sunlight or friction) causes (either carbohydrate synthesis or heat). Correspondingly, I doubt that 'is either carbohydrate synthesis or heat' is plausibly taken to be a natural kind predicate.

It is not strictly mandatory that one should agree with all this, but one denies it at a price. In particular, if one allows the full range of truth functional arguments inside the context 'it's a law that —', then one gives up the possibility of identifying the natural kind predicates of a science with those predicates which appear as the antecedents or the consequents of its proper laws. (Thus (6) would be a proper law of physics which fails to satisfy that condition.) One thus inherits the need for an alternative construal of the notion of a natural kind, and I don't know what that alternative might be like.

The upshot seems to be this. If we do not require that bridge statements must be laws, then either some of the generalizations to which the laws of special sciences reduce are not themselves lawlike, or some laws are not formulable in terms of natural kinds. Whichever way one takes (5), the important point is that it is weaker than standard reductivism: it does not require correspondences between the natural kinds of the reduced and the reducing science. Yet it is physicalistic on the same assumption that makes standard reductivism physicalistic (namely, that the bridge statements express true token identities). But these are precisely the properties that we wanted a revised account of the unity of science to exhibit.

I now want to give two reasons for thinking that this construal of the unity of science is right. First, it allows us to see how the laws of the special sciences could reasonably have exceptions, and, second, it allows us to see why there are special sciences at all. These points in turn.

Consider, again, the model of reduction implicit in (2) and (3). I assume that the laws of basic science are strictly exceptionless, and I assume that it is common knowledge that the laws of the special sciences are not. But now we have a painful dilemma. Since ' \rightarrow ' expresses a relation (or relations) which must be transitive, (1) can have exceptions only if the bridge laws do. But if the bridge laws have exceptions, reductivism loses its ontological bite, since we can no longer say that every event which consists of the instantiation of an S predicate is identical with some event which consists of the instantiation of a P predicate. In short, given the reduc-

tionist model, we cannot consistently assume that the bridge laws and the basic laws are exceptionless while assuming that the special laws are not. But we cannot accept the violation of the bridge laws unless we are willing to vitiate the ontological claim that is the main point of the reductionist program.

We can get out of this (*salve* the model) in one of two ways. We can give up the claim that the special laws have exceptions or we can give up the claim that the basic laws are exceptionless. I suggest that both alternatives are undesirable. The first because it flies in the face of fact. There is just no chance at all that the true, counterfactual supporting generalizations of, say, psychology, will turn out to hold in strictly each and every condition where their antecedents are satisfied. Even where the spirit is willing, the flesh is often weak. There are always going to be behavioral lapses which are physiologically explicable but which are uninteresting from the point of view of psychological theory. The second alternative is only slightly better. It may, after all, turn out that the laws of basic science have exceptions. But the question arises whether one wants the unity of science to depend upon the assumption that they do.

On the account summarized in (5), however, everything works out satisfactorily. A nomologically sufficient condition for an exception to $S_1x \rightarrow S_2x$ is that the bridge statements should identify some occurrence of the satisfaction of S_1 with an occurrence of the satisfaction of a P predicate which is not itself lawfully connected to the satisfaction of any P^* predicate. (I.e., suppose S_1 is connected to a P' such that there is no law which connects P' to any predicate which bridge statements associate with S_2 . Then any instantiation of S_1 which is contingently identical to an instantiation of P' will be an event which constitutes an exception to $S_1x \rightarrow S_2x$.) Notice that, in this case, we need assume no exceptions to the laws of the *reducing* science since, by hypothesis, (6) is not a law.

In fact, strictly speaking, (6) has no status in the reduction at all. It is simply what one gets when one universally quantifies a formula whose antecedent is the physical disjunction corresponding to S_1 and whose consequent is the physical disjunction corresponding to S_2 . As such, it will be true when $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ is exceptionless and false otherwise. What does the work of expressing the physical mechanisms whereby n -tuples of events conform, or fail to conform, to $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ is not (6) but the laws

which severally relate elements of the disjunction $P_1 \vee P_2 \vee \dots \vee P_n$ to elements of the disjunction $P_1^* \vee P_2^* \vee \dots \vee P_n^*$. When there is a law which relates an event that satisfies one of the P disjuncts to an event which satisfies one of the P^* disjuncts, the pair of events so related conforms to $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$. When an event which satisfies a P predicate is *not* related by law to an event which satisfies a P^* predicate, that event will constitute an exception to $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$. The point is that none of the laws which effect these several connections need themselves have exceptions in order that $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ should do so.

To put this discussion less technically: we could, if we liked, *require* the taxonomies of the special sciences to correspond to the taxonomy of physics by insisting upon distinctions between the natural kinds postulated by the former wherever they turn out to correspond to distinct natural kinds in the latter. This would *make* the laws of the special sciences exceptionless if the laws of basic science are. But it would also loose us precisely the generalizations which we want the special sciences to express. (If economics were to posit as many *kinds* of monetary systems as there are kinds of physical realizations of monetary systems, then the generalizations of economics *would* be exceptionless. But, presumably, only vacuously so, since there would be no generalizations left to state. Graham's law, for example, would have to be formulated as a vast, open disjunction about what happens in monetary system₁ or monetary system_n under conditions which would themselves defy uniform characterization. We would not be able to say what happens in monetary systems *tourt court* since, by hypothesis, 'is a monetary system' corresponds to no natural kind predicate of physics.)

In fact, what we do is precisely the reverse. We allow the generalizations of the special sciences to *have* exceptions, thus preserving the natural kinds to which the generalizations apply. But since we know that the *physical* descriptions of the natural kinds may be quite heterogeneous, and since we know that the physical mechanisms which connect the satisfaction of the antecedents of such generalizations to the satisfaction of their consequents may be equally diverse, we expect both that there will be exceptions to the generalizations and that these exceptions will be 'explained away' at the level of the reducing science. This is one of the respects in which physics really is assumed to be bedrock science; exceptions to *its* generaliza-

tions (if there are any) had better be random, because there is nowhere 'further down' to go in explaining the mechanism whereby the exceptions occur.

This brings us to why there are special sciences at all. Reductivism as we remarked at the outset, flies in the face of the facts about the scientific institution: the existence of a vast and interleaved conglomerate of special scientific disciplines which often appear to proceed with only the most token acknowledgment of the constraint that their theories must turn out to be physics 'in the long run.' I mean that the acceptance of this constraint, *in practice*, often plays little or no role in the validation of theories. Why is this so? Presumably, the reductivist answer must be *entirely* epistemological. If only physical particles weren't so small (if only brains were on the *outside*, where one can get a look at them), *then* we would do physics instead of palentology (neurology instead of psychology; psychology instead of economics; and so on down). There is an epistemological reply; namely, that even if brains were out where they can be looked *at*, as things now stand, we wouldn't know what to look *for*: we lack the appropriate theoretical apparatus for the psychological taxonomy of neurological events.

If it turns out that the functional decomposition of the nervous system corresponds to its neurological (anatomical, biochemical, physical) decomposition, then there are only epistemological reasons for studying the former instead of the latter. But suppose there is no such correspondence? Suppose the functional organization of the nervous system cross-cuts its neurological organization (so that quite different neurological structures can subservise identical psychological functions across times or across organisms). Then the existence of psychology depends not on the fact that neurons are so sadly small, but rather on the fact that neurology does not posit the natural kinds that psychology requires.

I am suggesting, roughly, that there are special sciences not because of the nature of our epistemic relation to the world, but because of the way the world is put together: not all natural kinds (not all the classes of things and events about which there are important, counterfactual supporting generalizations to make) are, or correspond to, physical natural kinds. A way of stating the classical reductionist view is that things which belong to different physical kinds *ipso facto* can have no projectible descriptions in common; that if x and y differ in those descriptions by virtue of which they fall under the proper laws of physics, they must differ in those descriptions by virtue of which they fall under any laws at all. But why should we believe that this is so? Any pair of entities, however different their physical structure, must nevertheless converge in indefinitely many of their properties. Why should there not be, among those convergent properties, some whose lawful interrelations support the generalizations of the special sciences? Why, in short, should not the natural kind predicates of the special sciences *cross-classify* the physical natural kinds?⁶

Physics develops the taxonomy of its subject-matter which best suits its purposes: the formulation of exceptionless laws which are basic in the several senses discussed above. But this is not the only taxonomy which may be required if the purposes of science in general are to be served: e.g., if we are to state such true, counterfactual supporting generalizations as there are to state. So, there are special sciences, with their specialized taxonomies, in the business of stating some of these generalizations. If science is to be unified, then all such taxonomies must apply *to the same things*. If physics is to be basic science, then each of these things had better be a physical thing. But it is not further required that the taxonomies which the special sciences employ must themselves reduce to the taxonomy of physics. It is not required, and it is probably not true.

NOTES

I wish to express my gratitude to Ned Block for having read a version of this paper and for the very useful comments he made.

1. I shall usually assume that sciences are about events, in at least the sense that it is the occurrence of events that makes the laws of a science true. But I shall be pretty free with the relation between events, states, things and properties. I shall even permit myself
2. The version of reductionism I shall be concerned with is a stronger one than many philosophers of science hold; a point worth emphasizing since my argument will be precisely that it is too strong to get

some latitude in construing the relation between properties and predicates. I realize that all these relations are problems, but they aren't my problem in this paper. Explanation has to *start* somewhere, too.

away with. Still, I think that what I shall be attacking is what many people have in mind when they refer to the unity of science, and I suspect (though I shan't try to prove it) that many of the liberalized versions suffer from the same basic defect as what I take to be the classical form of the doctrine.

3. There is an implicit assumption that a science simply *is* a formulation of a set of laws. I think this assumption is implausible, but it is usually made when the unity of science is discussed, and it is neutral so far as the main argument of this paper is concerned.
4. I shall sometimes refer to 'the predicate which constitutes the antecedent or consequent of a law.' This is shorthand for 'the predicate such that the an-

tecedent or consequent of a law consists of that predicate, together with its bound variables and the quantifiers which bind them.' (Truth functions of elementary predicates are, of course, themselves predicates in this usage.)

5. I don't think there is any chance at all that this is true. What is more likely is that type-identification for psychological states can be carried out in terms of the 'total states' of an abstract automaton which models the organism. For discussion, see Block and Fodor (1972).
6. As, by the way, the predicates of natural languages quite certainly do. For discussion, see Chomsky (1965).

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Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction

Jaegwon Kim

I. Introduction

It is part of today's conventional wisdom in philosophy of mind that psychological states are "multiply realizable," and are in fact so realized, in a variety of structures and organisms. We are constantly reminded that any mental state, say pain, is capable of "realization," "instantiation," or "implementation" in widely diverse neural-biological structures in humans, felines, reptiles, mollusks, and perhaps other organisms further removed from us. Sometimes we are asked to contemplate the possibility that extra-terrestrial creatures with a biochemistry radically different from the earthlings', or even electro-mechanical devices, can "realize the same psychology" that characterizes humans. This claim, to be called hereafter "the Multiple Realization Thesis" ("MR,"¹ for short), is widely accepted by philosophers, especially those who are inclined to favor the functionalist line on mentality. I will not here dispute the truth of

MR, although what I will say may prompt a re-assessment of the considerations that have led to its nearly universal acceptance.

And there is an influential and virtually uncontested view about the philosophical significance of MR. This is the belief that MR refutes psychophysical reductionism once and for all. In particular, the classic psychoneural identity theory of Feigl and Smart, the so-called "type physicalism", is standardly thought to have been definitively dispatched by MR to the heap of obsolete philosophical theories of mind. At any rate, it is this claim, that MR proves the physical irreducibility of the mental, that will be the starting point of my discussion.

Evidently, the current popularity of antireductionist physicalism is owed, for the most part, to the influence of the MR-based antireductionist argument originally developed by Hilary Putnam and elaborated further by Jerry Fodor²—rather more so than to the "anomalist" argument associated with Donald Davidson.³